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THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
Garrick B. Pursley∗
ABSTRACT
This Article provides the first systematic account of the relationship
between campaign finance and federalism. Federalism—a fundamental
characteristic of the constitutional structure—depends for its stability on
political mechanisms. States and their advocates and representatives in
Congress, federal agencies, political parties, intergovernmental lobbying
groups, and other political forums work together to check federal interference
with state governments. Entire normative theories of federalism depend on the
assumption that this system of political safeguards is working effectively in the
background.
But the federalism and constitutional theory literatures lack a rigorous
account of the effects of dramatic political change on pro-federalism political
dynamics. Building that account is particularly timely now. Political
safeguards work only if states retain significant political influence. But, as
recent elections vividly demonstrate, Citizens United has created a new class
of political operators—of which Super PACs are emblematic—whose potential
political influence may be limitless.
This Article’s thesis is that Super PACs have the capacity to undermine all
conventional political safeguards of federalism, pushing states far enough
down the hierarchy of political influence to dramatically reshape our system of
government. This insight highlights the underappreciated extent to which
Citizens United may have long-term structural consequences other than its
effects on democratic representation. These developments have significant
normative implications for federalism theory—at a minimum, they require
reexamining the common assumption, central to numerous normative claims,
that national political process is a durable channel for state self-defense.
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They also suggest new normative claims concerning campaign finance
doctrine. If sustaining federalism is a compelling governmental interest, then
federalism problems may justify new campaign spending restrictions despite
the First Amendment and the reasoning of Citizens United, which otherwise
appear to preclude further reforms.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 783
I. POLITICS IN FEDERALISM THEORY ..................................................... 790
A. The Normative Significance of Political Safeguards .................. 791
B. The Varieties of Political Safeguards ......................................... 798
II. DISRUPTING THE SYSTEM ................................................................... 805
A. Federal Campaign Finance Law—FECA to BCRA ................... 807
B. Citizens United and the Birth of Super PACs ............................. 814
III. SUPER PAC POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF
FEDERALISM ....................................................................................... 819
A. Incentives to Accommodate State Preferences ........................... 820
B. Political Parties .......................................................................... 828
C. The Intergovernmental Lobby .................................................... 841
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 852

PURSLEY GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

4/3/2014 2:50 PM

CAMPAIGN FINANCE SAFEGUARDS

783

INTRODUCTION
The 2012 election cycle, with over $6 billion in total campaign spending,
was the most expensive in U.S. history.1 Super PACs and other noncandidate,
nonparty groups spent an unprecedented $1.3 billion, the vast majority of
which came from a small set of “ultra-wealthy megadonors”2: Over sixty
percent of Super PAC money was donated by 132 individuals giving at least $1
million each, and ninety-eight percent came from fewer than 2,800 donors
giving at least $10,000 each.3 The two presidential campaigns raised $394
million from donors, contributing less than $200 each—an amount that Super
PACs raised from only 630 donors who each contributed at least $100,000.4
The advent of Super PAC politics in the wake of Citizens United v. FEC5
has changed federal elections and the incentives faced by federal candidates.
The explosive growth in electoral spending by Super PACs and other
organizations answerable to neither candidates nor political parties—much less
voters—threatens to capture and divert the policymaking apparatus to serve the
agendas of megadonors, drowning out the influence of less wealthy or less
disciplined constituencies. Among the displaced are those who press stategovernment interests in federal policymaking—the “federalism constituency”
that is essential to the operation of federalism’s political safeguards. Despite
the longstanding consensus that political safeguards exist and are important
stabilizers of the constitutional structure, the interactions of campaign finance
with federalism have gone almost completely unexamined.
This Article provides the first systematic account of those interactions and
explores the implications of Citizens United—particularly the growing power
of Super PACs and similar independent campaign spending groups—for
federalism’s political safeguards. Different models of political federalism
1 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for Responsive Politics Predicts,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 31, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-electionspending-will-reach-6.html [hereinafter 2012 Election Spending].
2 Brian Imus, Distorted Democracy: Big Money and Dark Money in the 2012 Elections, ILL. PIRG
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.illinoispirg.org/news/ilp/distorted-democracy-big-money-and-dark-money-2012elections.
3 See Blair Bowie & Adam Lioz, Distorted Democracy: Post-Election Spending Analysis, U.S. PIRG
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/post%20election%20megaphones%20FINAL.
pdf (reporting outside-group spending at $1.28 billion in 2012); see also Imus, supra note 2 (presenting
analysis of pre-election campaign spending data, showing very similar results as the post-election analysis of
Bowie and Lioz); 2012 Election Spending, supra note 1.
4 See Imus, supra note 2.
5 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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emphasize the importance of different segments of the federalism constituency;
but unregulated electoral spending by independent entities swamps that
constituency’s influence in general and thus undermines nearly every form of
political safeguard for federalism proposed in the literature. Diminishing the
effectiveness of political safeguards, in turn, shifts the burden of sustaining
federalism to a judiciary with demonstrably limited capacity to implement
structural constitutional norms. These effects require reworking positive and
normative federalism theories and, if federalism’s value is significant enough,
revising federalism or campaign finance doctrine to counteract the
consequences of Citizens United.
Citizens United sparked serious criticism6 and rekindled debates about
elections and democracy in general;7 subsequent extension of the Court’s
reasoning to license unlimited fundraising and spending by outside groups like
Super PACs added fuel to the controversy.8 The “firewall” separating Super
PACs from candidates and parties is porous at best; thus, “in practice a [Super
PAC] is part of the campaign of the candidate it is aiding,” and their
expenditures are “for all practical purposes contributions to the candidates” for
which outside benefactors likely expect something in return.9 Other changes in
6 See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A30; Richard
Posner, Unlimited Campaign Spending—A Good Thing?, BECKER–POSNER BLOG (Apr. 8, 2012, 9:30 PM),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/04/unlimited-campaign-spendinga-good-thing-posner.html.
President Obama famously criticized the decision in the State of the Union address with the Justices looking
on. See 156 CONG. REC. H414, H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (statement of President Barack Obama).
7 Citizens United has been the focus of conferences held at the University of Virginia School of Law,
Cornell Law School, and Georgetown University Law Center, among others. See Symposium, Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission: Implications for the American Electoral Process, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 643 (2011); Caperton v. Massey Coal and Citizens United (“Hillary: The Movie”): What Effect Will
Two Leading Supreme Court Cases Have on State Courts?, GEO. L. (Jan. 26, 2010), http://apps.law.
georgetown.edu/webcasts/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=1008 (reproducing digital recordings of the joint Aspen
Institute–Georgetown Law symposium on Caperton and Citizens United); Law School Symposium to Examine
Controversial Supreme Court Campaign Finance Ruling Citizens United, U. VA. SCH. L. (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2011_spr/lawandpolitics.htm.
8 See Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1682–93 (2012) (canvassing critiques).
9 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 1685. “Firewall” in this context has been used metaphorically in the
media to describe the obstacles to candidate or party cooperation with Super PACs. See, e.g., Jake Sherman,
John Bresnahan & Kenneth P. Vogel, A Super PAC–Politician Firewall? Not Quite, POLITICO (Aug. 23, 2012,
4:35 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0812/79854.html. But it also refers to FEC-approved
measures that

prohibit the flow of information between employees or consultants providing services for the
person paying for the communication and those employees or consultants currently or previously
providing services to the candidate who is clearly identified in the communication, or the
candidate’s authorized committee, the candidate’s opponent, the opponent’s authorized committee,
or a political party committee.
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campaign finance law redirect donations from political parties to these groups,
circumventing the parties’ moderating effect that might otherwise temper
megadonor demands.10
The ramifications for democracy are significant. The results in 2012 appear
comforting—the largest Super PACs lost two-thirds of the races they funded;11
and while the majority of outside spending was directed against Democratic
candidates, President Obama was reelected and a number of Democratic
Senate and House nominees won, despite large Super PAC outlays on behalf of
their opponents.12 But it is a mistake to conclude that Citizens United and its
progeny have been proved insignificant.13 Megadonors appear undeterred and
say they’ll spend more on the next election.14 And there are subtler but
potentially more significant effects to assess: Increased outside spending
exacerbates the “polarizing, attack orientation of contemporary political
advertising”15 and heightens the potential capture of officials by interest
groups—long the central concern of campaign finance regulation.16 Elected
officials have different incentives now: If they say the right things and vote the
right way, they gain access to a new unlimited mountain of campaign money;
but if they act against outside-group interests, they face the prospect of that
mountain supporting a challenger. This dramatically increases the influence of

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(h)(1) (2012).
10 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1705, 1714 (1999) (noting that the influence of large donors giving through normal channels “is
profoundly qualified by the give and take of candidates who must stake out positions across a variety of issues
and by political parties that have strong institutional interests in hewing to a middle course”); see also Michael
S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 42–44 (2012).
11 See Anupama Narayanswamy, More Than Two-Thirds of Outside Spending Backed Losing
Candidates, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/
Return-on-investment-story/.
12 See Michael Beckel & Russ Choma, Super PACs, Nonprofits Favored Romney over Obama, CENTER
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 30, 2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/10/29/11630/super-pacsnonprofits-favored-romney-over-obama (revealing that Republican-leaning Super PACs more than doubled
Democratic-leaning groups’ spending in 2012—and, in the presidential election in particular, the former more
than tripled the latter’s spending); David Weigel, Take the Money and Lose: Why Did Republican Super PACs
Waste So Many Millions on Bad TV?, SLATE (Nov. 7, 2012, 7:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/politics/2012/11/gop_super_pacs_republican_donors_spent_millions_on_tv_ads_and_got_almost.
html (“[N]ever has so much money been spent for so little gain.”).
13 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Big Money Lost, but Don’t Be Relieved, CNN (Nov. 9, 2012, 2:32 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/opinion/hasen-outside-political-money/index.html.
14 See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, Adelson to Keep Betting on the GOP, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2012, at A1.
15 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 1714–15.
16 See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 127–30 (2010)
(characterizing campaign finance as a means of capture, also referred to as “clientelism”).
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large donors over federal officials’ agendas.17 Even candidates who oppose
Super PACs and outside spending have to rely on them to stay competitive.18
These dynamics also threaten democratic participation by expanding the
perception that wealthy interests control the government19 and by decreasing
candidates’ incentives to cultivate broader bases of smaller donors.20
Unexamined so far, however, are the effects of Super PAC politics—and,
indeed, of modern campaign finance law generally—on federalism.21
Federalism and campaign finance seem unrelated at first blush—the structure
of government presumably does not change from election to election. A central
thesis of this Article, however, is that they are connected in important ways.
First, Citizens United and its progeny have changed the structure of American
politics in ways that have serious implications for federalism’s political
safeguards. Second, damage to these safeguards may undermine federalism’s
democracy-enhancing benefits—expanded opportunities for civic participation,
enhanced accountability, responsiveness, etc.—that might otherwise
compensate for expanded interest-group influence.22 Shoring up the system of
political federalism against these threats might form part of a systemic solution
to the broader problems Citizens United creates for democracy.
One core thesis common to political safeguards theories is that judicial
efforts to protect federalism have been ineffectual23 and that state governments
17

See Briffault, supra note 8, at 1692; Hasen, supra note 13.
See Nicholas Confessore, Result Won’t Limit Campaign Money Any More Than Ruling Did, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2012, at A21.
19 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010); see also BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, NATIONAL SURVEY: SUPER
PACS, CORRUPTION, AND DEMOCRACY 2–3 (2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
Democracy/CFR/SuperPACs_Corruption_Democracy.pdf (noting that “[t]wo in three Americans . . . trust
government less because big donors to Super PACs have more influence than regular voters”); Liz Kennedy,
Citizens Actually United: The Overwhelming, Bipartisan Opposition to Corporate Political Spending and
Support for Achievable Reforms 1–2, DĒMOS (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/
publications/CitizensActuallyUnited_CorporatePoliticalSpending.pdf (noting that eight in ten Americans think
the wealthy “drown[] out the voices of average Americans” in politics).
20 See Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1263, 1291–92 (2012).
21 Cf. Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation, and Federal Safeguards, 96 NW. U.
L. REV. 977, 980 (2002) (examining the effects of political nationalization on party safeguards). Scholars
occasionally mention the connection between campaign finance and federalism in passing. See, e.g., Lynn A.
Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 116
(2001) (noting without explanation that “[a]lteration of the ways election campaigns are financed likewise
might alter the nature and role of the parties” within the context of the political safeguards of federalism).
22 See infra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16–22 (2004)
(explaining that, to the extent judicial efforts balance hard and soft doctrines, they have been suboptimal).
18
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nevertheless remain viable components of the constitutional system.24
Therefore, some nonjudicial mechanism(s) must have helped preserve the
states’ viability.25 While most scholars agree that there are such mechanisms,
there is significant debate about their nature.26 Some cite the incentives
generated by states’ roles in constituting the federal government and the
subnational constituencies to which most federal officials are answerable;27
others emphasize political parties,28 intergovernmental lobbying,29 or state
collaboration in federal administrative processes;30 and yet others point to
inertia in federal institutions31 or other mechanisms.32 We can usefully
distinguish ex ante safeguards that provide incentives for federal officials to
consider state interests before acting from ex post safeguards that provide
states with influence over the implementation of federal programs.33 The
former seem more important than the latter because they empower states to
shape federal policy from the outset and because they are the more-accepted
backstops for judicial review.34 These mechanisms interact in complex ways;35
24

Cf. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 218–19 (2000) (“[T]he new politics . . . [has] preserved the states’ voice in national
councils by linking the political fortunes of state and federal officials through their mutual dependence on
decentralized political parties.”).
25 See. id. (noting that despite academic disagreement about the mechanics, there remains “the nagging
sense so many people share that [the idea of political safeguards] captures something real, that there are
‘political safeguards of federalism’ that reduce or eliminate the need for judicial oversight of Congress on
behalf of states”).
26 Some debate the relative importance of judicial and nonjudicial safeguards. Compare, e.g., Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 547–52 (1954) (giving a seminal account of federalism’s
“political safeguards”), with Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1390–95 (2001) (arguing that both political and judicial safeguards are necessary to sustain federalism).
27 See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 546.
28 See Kramer, supra note 24, at 224, 233–34.
29 See generally JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009).
30 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1307 (2009); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1949 (2008); Heather K. Gerken,
The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 19 (2010).
31 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321,
1330 (2001).
32 See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
33 Compare, e.g., Kramer, supra note 24, at 256–65 (discussing the states’ influence in major political
parties as an ex ante safeguard), with Gerken, supra note 30, at 37–44 (discussing the relationship between
federal and state governments as an ex post safeguard).
34 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–51 & n.11 (1985).
35 See JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 95–131 (2009) (arguing that
federalism is best characterized as a complex system that includes multiple, overlapping safeguards); Jenna
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and while complexity increases the system’s durability, it is also a liability if
disruption of one component disproportionately affects others or the system as
a whole.36 Even if we cannot identify the “correct” safeguards or distinguish
the candidate mechanisms by importance, we can assess the implications of
significant political shifts for the system.
Super PAC politics may undermine each of these political safeguards.
Drawing on constitutional theory, public and social choice theory, positive
political theory, systems theory, and political science literatures on parties and
lobbies, I argue that dramatically increasing the influence of private interests in
federal elections further distances candidates from their local constituencies,
damages networks of state and federal officials in political parties, swamps the
influence of intergovernmental lobby groups that advocate states’ institutional
interests in Washington, and, by decreasing the diversity of interests to which
federal policymakers are accountable, makes less onerous the very federal
lawmaking process whose inertia arguably holds back the tide of federal action
impacting the states. The states have proven resilient and adaptable political
operators, remaining viable through various changes to the campaign finance
environment, including the introduction of comprehensive federal regulation,
the exploitation of issue-ad and soft-money loopholes, and subsequent reforms.
But these post–Citizens United developments are qualitatively different and
may be significant enough to outpace the states’ capacity for adaptation. Past
increases in private-interest-group influence—facilitated, for example, by the
advent of soft money—were in part offset by party mediation and remained
limited enough to require candidates to remain somewhat loyal to their
Bednar, The Political Science of Federalism, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 269, 279–80 (2011) (noting, for
example, that “safeguards are needed for each level of government”). See generally ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011) (describing federal–state institutional relationships as complex,
negotiated, and regularly revised); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549
(2012) (noting that there are multiple, competing accounts of how political federalism works in our system);
Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (describing federal–state negotiations in a
variety of forums as a factor sustaining federalism).
36 On the possibility of disproportionately large or small effects of perturbations in complex
political/legal systems, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 30 (2012), and Jenna
Bednar, Constitutional Systems Theory: A Research Agenda Motivated by Vermeule, The System of the
Constitution and Epstein, Design for Liberty, 48 TULSA L. REV. 325, 331 (2012) (book review) (noting that
“aggregation effects can be non-linear; incremental improvements could make the whole [system] much better
than the marginal change to the component. But it could also make it worse, perhaps much worse”). For an
overview of how these ideas affect constitutional theory debates in the federalism and separation of powers
context, see Garrick B. Pursley, Properties in Constitutional Systems, 92 N.C. L. REV. 547, 561–62, 580–83
(2014) (reviewing VERMEULE, supra). These theoretical moves all draw on Lorenz’s seminal insight about the
“butterfly effect” at the founding of chaos theory. See EDWARD N. LORENZ, THE ESSENCE OF CHAOS 181–84
(1993).
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subnational constituencies.37 Super PACs can fund entire campaigns
themselves, circumventing the parties and eliminating the need to cultivate
small donors. Elections are important moments in which voters may reward or
punish officials for their approaches to federalism; but as voters’ influence
decreases, elections become less and less of a true federalism safeguard.38
Already, political professionals blame Super PACs for dramatic decreases in
state political party fundraising,39 voters overwhelmingly feel disconnected
from their elected representatives,40 and lobbyists affiliated with Super PACs
or their donors wield significantly enhanced leverage in Washington.41 Even if
Super PACs do not consistently oppose state interests, their unlimited financial
influence means that their donors’ priorities will displace those of the states,
pushing state preferences down or off the federal agenda and, thus, still
effectively short-circuiting the political safeguards.
A thorough account of the connections between campaign finance and
federalism highlights the importance of incorporating structural considerations
into campaign finance theory and doctrine; and it requires adapting federalism
theory to political reality. It also supports new normative claims in both fields.
Super PAC politics might justify new approaches to federalism doctrine that
either reinforce damaged safeguards or introduce a more effective judicial
approach. Also intriguing are the possibilities for new normative claims about
campaign finance doctrine. For example, the Citizens United Court focused
solely on the free speech implications of campaign finance regulations and
rejected everything but the narrow governmental interest in precluding quid
pro quo corruption—direct cash-for-votes exchanges—as a constitutionally
permissible basis for spending restrictions.42 Campaign finance scholars argue
that this closes most avenues for ameliorative reforms.43 This Article
demonstrates that constitutional norms other than the First Amendment are at
stake—the tension between post–Citizens United law and federalism norms
37 See infra Part III.A (discussing Super PACs’ capacity to distort the relationship between officials and
their geographic constituencies); cf. Overton, supra note 20, at 1263 (suggesting that candidates may now have
an increased incentive to instead remain loyal to wealthy donors).
38 Cf. Sean Nicholson-Crotty, National Election Cycles and the Intermittent Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 38 PUBLIUS 295, 296, 300–05 (2008) (presenting evidence that political safeguards are most
effective in election years).
39 See infra notes 253–58 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 363–65 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 384–96 and accompanying text.
42 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–61 (2010).
43 See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1155, 1156–59 (2011).
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suggests a new approach to campaign finance issues. The governmental
interest in preserving the fundamental character of the constitutional
structure,44 combined with the conventional anticorruption rationale, provides
an entirely new and untried basis for regulation that might, finally, outweigh
outside groups’ interests in speaking by funneling large sums of money to
political campaigns.
In Part I, I canvas federalism theory, highlighting a variety of mechanisms
proposed as part of the system of political safeguards, the system’s
vulnerabilities to disruptions of the broader political process, and, by situating
the safeguards in several theoretical contexts, various normative implications
of their disruption for federalism theory. In Part II, I discuss the development
of modern campaign finance law both to frame Citizens United and subsequent
actions and to highlight various senses in which campaign finance regulation
and federalism have long interacted. I also explore the impact of Super PACs
and other outside groups in the election cycles after Citizens United. In Part III,
I set out the implications of these developments for the political safeguards
discussed in Part I. I conclude with a brief examination of the directions that a
new federalism theory incorporating a more realistic assessment of the
conventional political safeguards might take and the new normative case for
modifying campaign finance doctrines.
I. POLITICS IN FEDERALISM THEORY
The claim that there are political safeguards for federalism45 is a
constitutional bromide—the two levels of the federal system are meant to
interact and check each other, as do the branches of the federal government.46
Madison’s “double security” for liberty included the horizontal separation of
powers between federal branches and the vertical division of power “between
two distinct governments”—national and state—that would interact, compete
for popular support, and prevent each other from growing too powerful.47 Even
if nothing else is settled, political changes that undermine the states’ capacity

44 Cf. Overton, supra note 20, at 1273 (proposing the governmental interest in increasing democratic
participation as a new justification for campaign finance regulation).
45 See supra notes 23–36 and accompanying text (canvassing political safeguards theories).
46 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 45–47, 51 (James Madison).
47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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to resist federal encroachment through the mechanisms of this system
undermine a basic structural mandate of the Constitution.48
Scholars disagree on the particulars of federalism’s nonjudicial safeguards;
how well they function; and the significance of their existence and
effectiveness for other aspects of federalism theory, doctrine, and practice. In
this Part, I survey views about the nature of the political safeguards and the
normative stakes for federalism theory if they are undermined. First, keep in
mind that because these safeguards often figure in more general theories of
federalism, changes to political safeguards may require, among other things,
new theoretical or normative accounts of the legitimacy and value of judicial
intervention on federalism, the nature and content of constitutional federalism
norms or judicial federalism doctrine, and the best allocation of federalismrelated decisionmaking among institutions. Second, and regardless of one’s
normative theory of federalism, there is a natural affinity between the values of
federalism—such as enhanced government responsiveness and civic
participation—and the values that we draw on to structure campaign law,
including democratic accountability, freedom of expression, and equal access
and representation. This value resonance underscores my claim that our theory
and doctrine must account for campaign law’s effects on federalism.49 Insofar
as a durable federalist constitutional system fosters these democratic values,
damaging federalism may be a different way that Citizens United and its
analytical offspring damage democracy generally. The corollary is that
strengthening federalism may counteract the antidemocratic effects of interestgroup influence to diminish that damage. Assessing these possibilities requires
understanding the political aspects of federalism and their place in
constitutional theory.
A. The Normative Significance of Political Safeguards
Historically, a central premise of federalism theory was that the
Constitution established separate spheres of federal and state regulatory
authority and precluded the levels from interfering with each other’s

48 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (noting that federalism must be enforced
“even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone”).
49 See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS 75–76 (2009) (discussing the values of federalism); Overton, supra note 20, at 1260–64 (discussing
the values of campaign finance law).
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domains.50 This view, which has come to be known as “dual federalism,”
leaves little room for political safeguards; its crisp conceptual categories are
designed to be judicially enforceable external constraints on the political
process.51 Other theories—such as those predicated on originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation—posit a similarly fixed allocation of power.52
Federalism does, however, have nonjudicial aspects—federal and state
officials bargain over regulatory jurisdiction throughout the federal
policymaking process,53 and dualism fails insofar as it ignores these extrajudicial processes or suggests that they have no bearing on the articulation and
enforcement of federalism norms.54 The normative import of political change
for federalism theory, however, varies with one’s underlying view of the
relationship between federalism’s political aspects and constitutional
federalism norms.
Perhaps the Constitution requires no substantive allocation of power, but
only that states play a certain role in the national political process.55 Drastic
changes that fall short of eliminating the states’ prescribed political role but
diminish the political process’s tendency to protect federalism, on this view,
either lack a judicial corrective—because politics is the exclusive permissible
50 See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950) (stating
that the federal and state governments, within each of their spheres, are sovereign).
51 See id. at 2–3.
52 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 10, 13, 15 (1987) (arguing that,
according to originalism, “judges are confined to the four corners of the Constitution” as it was understood by
the Founders).
53 See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 543–44 (arguing that federal and state governments bargain over the
“distribution of authority” in various extrajudicial processes); Young, supra note 23, at 132 (describing the
“presumption against preemption” as designed to force additional congressional deliberation about the
federalism impacts of preemption, and thus to give the political safeguards more chances to operate).
54 Scholars note that dualism as an actual approach to judicial federalism doctrine was “in ruins” by the
1950s. E.g., Corwin, supra note 50, at 17. After the New Deal, it became increasingly clear that federal and
state powers were broadly concurrent in practice, such that attempting to police separate spheres of federal and
state regulatory power was impractical and inconsistent with the reality of modern governance. See Young,
supra note 23, at 104–07 (discussing the demise of dual federalism and arguing that courts interested in
safeguarding federalism “must operate in a world of largely concurrent state and federal regulatory
jurisdiction”).
55 Few maintain that political safeguards are the exclusive permissible safeguards for federalism. See
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 193–209 (1980) (advancing this view); see also
Young, supra note 26, at 1367 & nn.80–81. But see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1459–60 (2001) (critiquing this
view). The Supreme Court rejected this view. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–19 (2000).
The Court, contrary to Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, impliedly rejected the contention that the
Constitution “remits [limitations of federal power] to politics.” See id. at 649 (Souter, J., dissenting). Not even
Wechsler held that position. See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 559.
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safeguard—or provide new grounds for judicial intervention on a
representation–reinforcement theory.56 If the Constitution entrenches no
general federalism norms,57 then judicial review of federalism issues—aside
from enforcing those few textual provisions that expressly address states—is
justifiable, if at all, only on nonfederalism grounds.58 Political change that
destabilizes the structure threatens federalism’s instrumental benefits, but on
this view creates no constitutional justification for judicial intervention unless
it violates nonfederalism norms. Federalism-oriented normative claims, on this
view, must be grounded on federalism’s instrumental values.59
“Compatibilist” federalism theories skip questions about federalism norms
to propose structural innovations with various substantive goals whose benefits
depend on federalism’s instrumental values—benefits of regulatory pluralism,
for example—and whose success depends on the stability of those values.60 In
environmental law, for example, federal–state cooperation arguably could
improve pollution control, renewable energy development, and ecosystem
management, among other things.61 Others propose innovations aimed at
broader objectives—enhancing rights protection, democratic accountability
56 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1833–36 (2005) (defending an approach to
federalism doctrine incorporating significant comparative institutional analysis as a means for courts “to
reinforce rather than supplant the political branches’ own institutional mechanisms for handling federalism
issues,” suggesting, thus, “an intermediate role for courts—not as alternative decision makers, but as
collaborators who sit to ensure that the essential checks and balances within the political branches remain in
place”); Young, supra note 23, at 164 (proposing a “Democracy and Distrust for federalism” doctrine in which
courts primarily work to reinforce the operation of federalism’s political and process safeguards); cf. JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87–104 (1980) (formulating a
general representation–reinforcement theory of judicial review).
57 See generally John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009) (denying the legitimacy of inferring general federalism norms
from the constitutional text).
58 Cf. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 903, 907–10 (1994) (arguing that state “sovereignty” is an incoherent concept and that federalismreinforcing doctrines are defensible, if at all, only on instrumental grounds that would equally support a unitary
but bureaucratically decentralized national government with no sovereign subunits).
59 See Garrick B. Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1383–92 (2011) (reviewing
SCHAPIRO, supra note 49) (canvassing Schapiro’s instrumental arguments); Young, supra note 23, at 8
(discussing federalism’s values).
60 See Pursley, supra note 59, at 1367 (proposing “compatibilism” as a category of federalism theories
that reconciles in various ways the existence of constitutional federalism norms with the realities of modern
intergovernmental practice, and canvassing examples).
61 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108,
122–26 (2005); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099
(2009). See generally Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 881–83,
916–40 (2011) (canvassing the literature on federal–state cooperation in environmental regulation).
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and participation, etc.62 These instrumental values depend on political
safeguards: The very possibility of regulatory experimentation in laboratories
of democracy or pluralistic regimes with regulations tailored to local
conditions depends on preserving some independent state authority.63 Judicial
intervention has not appreciably impeded federal preemption, which threatens
precisely this state regulatory autonomy;64 thus durable federalism values seem
to require, among other things, the political means for states to resist federal
encroachment.65 Political change that undermines the political safeguards,
then, may undermine compatibilist normative claims that depend on
federalism’s instrumental values for their defensibility. It may also undermine
cooperative regimes by increasing centralizing pressures or decreasing states’
willingness to enforce federal mandates. The real theoretical impact depends
on the values at stake.
It is worth noting that most federalism theories leverage these instrumental
values in some sense—their existence, if not their weight, is a matter of general
consensus among federalism scholars.66 And if, as some hold, robust
62 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4
(2008) (arguing, among other things, that “Congress should . . . be guided by the underlying values of
federalism—including efficiency, participation, concern for externalities, and fostering community”);
SCHAPIRO, supra note 49, at 6–7 (emphasizing federalism’s values for promoting political pluralism and
dialogue and, over time, aiding in the articulation and acceptance of fundamental rights). See generally
Pursley, supra note 59, at 1383–84 (canvassing this literature).
63 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing the
states as laboratories for innovation); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (explaining that
the federalist system encourages pluralism—“[i]t assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society”).
64 See David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 514
(2008) (noting the courts’ “fluid, unconstrained approach to federal preemption”); Garrick B. Pursley,
Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 530–31 (2010) (noting that judicial silence regarding
preemption’s constitutional “authorizing norm” has the practical effect of granting Congress plenary power to
preempt state law provided that it makes clear its intent to do so); Young, supra note 23, at 30–32, 130–34
(noting that the five Rehnquist Court Justices most invested in the “federalist revival,” beginning in the mid1990s, failed to protect state autonomy when it came to limiting federal preemption, and arguing that
federalism reasons support stronger doctrinal limits on preemption). Cf. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 1013–14 (2002) (arguing that the presumption
against preemption, essentially the only doctrinal limit on federal preemption of state law, is unevenly applied
and, in some cases, may actually work against state autonomy).
65 See Young, supra note 23, at 130–34 (emphasizing preemption’s effects).
66 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 386–405 (1997) (examining typical
federalism values); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 266
(2005) (“[C]ommentators generally offer a variety of presumed benefits [of federalism], clustering around five
areas: responsive governance, governmental competition, innovation, participatory democracy, and resisting
tyranny.”); David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to
Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 631 (2013) (“Most constitutional scholars who have written about
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federalism enhances democratic accountability, responsiveness, and civic
participation in our system,67 then political change that undermines federalism
may be critiqued as undermining values also central to campaign finance
debates. This symmetry suggests, in other words, that the connection between
the fields is deeper and perhaps more important than has been noted and that
normative claims in one field might benefit from justification in terms of the
other—hence, my argument that federalism’s complimentary instrumental
value further supports modifying campaign finance doctrine to better account
for federalism considerations.
Most contemporary federalism theories advance more modest claims. We
might, for example, avoid interpretive controversy by hypothesizing a simple
federalism norm requiring only that there be both federal and state
governments and that neither level of government may undermine the separate
existence of the other.68 This leaves power allocation issues for constitutional
“construction”69—for federalism, an iterative, multitrack process by which
constitutional permissions and prohibitions are contested, clarified, resolved,
and altered in the interactions between federal and state officials in and beyond
mandatory channels, including within political parties, lobbying groups, and
informal negotiations.70 Participants in construction may weigh conventional
federalism values and other pragmatic considerations equally.71 On this
account, political safeguards are important, but their optimal structure is
influenced by a wider variety of pragmatic factors—“administrative safeguards

federalism in the past twenty years have acknowledged at least some extent of agreement about the now welldeveloped catalogue of ‘values of federalism.’”); id. at n.230 (collecting sources).
67 See Gregory P. Magarian, Toward Political Safeguards of Self-Determination, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1219,
1255 (2001) (highlighting federalism’s benefits for democratic participation).
68 See Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 497, 512–23 (2012).
69 See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (describing the concept of “constitutional construction” and distinguishing
it from constitutional interpretation); Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the
Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127 (2004)
(analyzing the views of members of Congress about Congress’s role as a constitutional interpreter); Lawrence
B. Solum, The Interpretation–Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103–08 (2010) (providing a
thorough conceptual overview of constitutional construction as the notion is currently understood in the
constitutional theory literature and distinguishing construction from interpretation).
70 See, e.g., NUGENT, supra note 29, at 5–8 (discussing constitutional construction in various
policymaking processes); Ryan, supra note 35, at 4 (recognizing “intergovernmental bargaining” as a means
by which power is allocated between the federal and state governments); see also Bruce G. Peabody & John D.
Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2003) (arguing
that the intergovernmental lobby works as an extra-constitutional mechanism to protect the states).
71 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 69, at 3–10.
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of federalism,”72 for example, may be consistent with our hypothetical simple
federalism norm and justified on efficiency or institutional-capacity grounds.73
Alternatively, the Constitution may require some exclusive federal and state
powers, concurrent authority over most subjects, which some federal actions
pass through the state-protective Article I legislative process, and that the
levels cannot interfere significantly with each other’s authority. Here, power
allocation norms should be articulated and enforced primarily in the political
process, which is better suited to questions of regulatory capacity in areas of
concurrent authority. Judicial review is better suited to enforcing clear textual
preclusions of federal or state action, maintaining a rough balance of federal
and state power, or implementing the abstract noninterference norm I
mentioned above—all tasks that involve fairly standard constitutional
reasoning rather than the kinds of political or policy judgments for which
courts are poorly suited.74 Eroding mandatory political safeguards may, on this
view, violate constitutional norms and destabilize the system enough to require
compensating adjustments.75
These are summary characterizations of nuanced positions in a complex
debate. Most views do, however, assume that some nonjudicial safeguards
protect the system against disruptions that courts cannot or should not address.
The normative significance of eroding nonjudicial safeguards varies with the
relative importance assigned to judicial and political enforcement. That
prioritization may be based on constitutional or comparative-institutional-

72 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 30, at 1285 & n.103 (discussing this phrase’s meaning).
There is some debate among scholars concerning which features or practices within federal administrative
agencies—if any—actually function to safeguard state autonomy. Compare id. at 1285–86 (arguing that the
states’ roles as implementers of federal law in many federal regulatory regimes gives the states the voice to
press their interests in the federal administrative process), with Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the
New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2100–07 (2008) (maintaining that federal agencies can and should
consciously consider and account for state interests in making regulatory decisions).
73 See generally Pursley, supra note 59 (describing pragmatic justifications for various federalism
doctrines); Young, supra note 23, at 65–122 (discussing the relevance of institutional capacity considerations
to assessing nearly every type of federalism doctrine).
74 See Pursley, supra note 68, at 512–28 (describing methods by which courts craft doctrinal rules, tests,
and standards to implement broad, abstract constitutional norms like this noninterference norm); Young, supra
note 56, at 1816–30 (discussing the institutional capacities of courts to address various aspects of federalism
controversies); id. at 1837–38 (noting that “clear text” provides straightforward legal reasons of the kind courts
are accustomed to relying upon); id. at 1840–44 (arguing that courts are competent to make “compensating
adjustments” to maintain a rough balance of state and federal power).
75 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative
Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2117, 2134 (2008) (arguing that Article I process is
“nonoptional”); Young, supra note 56, at 1748–60 (defending compensating adjustments).
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capacity considerations.76 If the division of labor is constitutionally mandatory,
then damaging the political safeguards directly undermines the federalism
norms themselves or the handling of federalism issues assigned to political
institutions. If political safeguards are primary for instrumental reasons, their
erosion may justify expanding judicial intervention to compensate. If courts
lack capacity, then we have new reasons to reinvigorate political safeguards
legislatively or with different campaign finance doctrine. If judicial review is
primary, then we might similarly cite process failures to justify more or
different judicial intervention. If judicial enforcement is inherently ineffective
for some federalism disputes, eroding nonjudicial mechanisms will increase
nonremediable violations and, thus, threaten federalism’s instrumental
benefits.
Aside from enforcing norms, nonjudicial safeguards also may provide
important forums for constitutional construction.77 Construction generates
quasi-constitutional norms that are relatively binding on repeat players—
similar to congressional precedents but with varying binding force.78 On some
accounts of constitutionalism, nonjudicial views of constitutional meaning are
significant in themselves;79 and in any event, on a thin-norm federalism
theory—or a theory in which state authority is largely concurrent with federal
authority—these constructive norms guide actors where the Constitution itself
does not, and thus have tremendous practical significance.80 For federalism,
this naturally suggests that state officials should have a role in deciding power
allocation issues that are subject to construction. If states are excluded, the
system loses their expertise and perspective as well as the legitimizing value of
their participation in negotiating these quasi-constitutional federalism norms.81

76 Compare CHOPER, supra note 55, at 193–209, with Young, supra note 56, at 1816–20 (discussing the
need for comparative institutional analysis).
77 See sources cited supra note 69.
78 Cf. Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008) (assessing the
theoretical and practical significance of legislative practice precedents). See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Eric
A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008) (describing
congressional practice norms as “soft law,” examining their legal status and effects, and arguing that such
norms take on constitutional character in some circumstances); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the
Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007) (arguing that “ordinary” statutes that discharge constitutional functions
should be considered part of our constitutional law).
79 See, e.g., Peabody & Nugent, supra note 70, at 54 (noting that “the intergovernmental lobby” helps
define “spheres of state and federal authority”).
80 See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 6–8.
81 See Ryan, supra note 35, at 5–7 (“[B]argaining enables a partnership of state and federal actors to
interpret constitutional directives . . . across the state-federal divide.”).

PURSLEY GALLEYSPROOFS

798

4/3/2014 2:50 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:781

Judicial review has had practically no effect on the allocation of federal and
state power, even at high points of judicial attention to federalism—e.g., the
era of Commerce Clause formalism preceding the New Deal in which the
Court enforced dual federalism religiously but with little practical impact on
state power or federal expansion.82 The Rehnquist Court’s attempt at a
“federalist revival,” too, made little difference: bolstering state sovereign
immunity and enforcing an anticommandeering principle is not much use when
the actions most dangerous for state power—federal preemption and
conditional spending—remain essentially unrestrained.83 Nevertheless, state
governments remain robust components of our system.84 Nonjudicial
safeguards—whatever their form—therefore must be central to explaining
what has stabilized federalism for so long.85 Threats to the political safeguards,
a fortiori, can create serious systemic problems.
B. The Varieties of Political Safeguards
It is difficult to specify a correct allocation of federal and state power—it is
contested, shifting, and largely a policy question—but the processes that
sustain some balance are easier to identify and perhaps more important.
Despite disagreement about the scope and content of constitutional federalism
norms, most federalism scholars assume that there are nonjudicial safeguards
even if they focus primarily on judicial federalism doctrine.86 The few who
have examined the matter at length identify several plausible nonjudicial
safeguards.
82 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 49, at 40–45; Kramer, supra note 24, at 229–33; see also Matthew D. Adler
& Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yesky, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71,
72; Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1313–26 (1999) (arguing that judicial
review is generally ineffective because federal courts’ institutional environment counsels deference to the
other federal branches); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court,
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906, 908 (2006). Systemic failure of political safeguards may create hydraulic
pressure for increased judicial intervention which, given this track record, might be counterproductive.
83 See Kramer, supra note 24, at 230–33; Smith, supra note 82, at 908 (noting that the Rehnquist Court
“limited Congress’s power to force state officials to implement federal law, but left virtually unchecked
Congress’s power to accomplish the same end through the use of conditioned spending” (footnote omitted));
Young, supra note 23, at 130–60 (discussing the significance of preemption in relation to other threats to
federalism).
84 See Kramer, supra note 24, at 227–28.
85 See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP: INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 36–47, 60–63 (1962) (documenting historical examples disproving
federalism’s “demise”); see also JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE
GOVERNMENT 1–10 (2002).
86 See Young, supra note 26, at 1367 (observing that most “defenders of a judicial role” in federalism
preservation nevertheless acknowledge political safeguards).

PURSLEY GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

4/3/2014 2:50 PM

CAMPAIGN FINANCE SAFEGUARDS

799

Wechsler’s seminal article highlighted two,87 both of which have since
been drawn into doubt.88 The first was a political “mood” in which “national
action” was “regarded as exceptional . . . , an intrusion to be justified by some
necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case.”89 This may once have
imposed special burdens on those seeking federal action, but, today, the default
in many areas is an expectation of federal action.90 Wechsler’s principal focus
was on the states’ “crucial role in the selection and the composition of the
national authority.”91 By making federal officials dependent on state
governments—through state control of House electoral districts, etc.—and
geographically limited subnational constituencies, the argument goes, the
Constitution gives states a voice in federal policymaking sufficient to protect
themselves against federal intrusion.92 Federal lawmakers have incentives to
consider state preferences because states control their political fortunes to a
degree. Critics charge that this contention conflates the interests of
geographically circumscribed constituencies with the interests of state
governments as institutions.93 Indeed, federal officials’ incentive to maximize
constituent support by delivering policy will often place them in competition
with state institutions serving the same voters—they will opt for federal action,
for which they can claim credit, even at the expense of state autonomy.94
Things would be different if constituents valued federalism in itself, but most
voters prioritize substantive policy objectives over structural matters.95 And
87

See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 544, 546.
See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor
Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s reliance on political safeguards
theories); William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139 (1998).
89 Wechsler, supra note 26, at 544.
90 See Baker & Young, supra note 21, at 113; Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1485, 1506 (1994).
91 Wechsler, supra note 26, at 546.
92 See id.
93 See Kramer, supra note 24, at 221–23.
94 See id. at 223–24; Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 266–68
(1990) (examining the public choice theory hypothesis that federal officials will make federal–state power
allocation decisions based, not on concern for federalism, but on their self-interest—thus even seemingly profederalism actions may be strategic: “Congress will delegate to local regulators only when the political support
it obtains from deferring to the states is greater than the political support it obtains from regulating itself”).
95 See Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131, 131 (2004) (noting
that much of officials’ rhetoric about federalism is strategically deployed to camouflage other policy goals and
that “even if the American people were well informed about the benefits of federalism, they would still trade
off those benefits in order to secure other policy objectives”); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs.
States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 103 (2004) (arguing
88
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where Congress does respond to state interests, politically powerful states—
e.g., battleground states—tend to attract disproportionate attention from
officials concerned with their own and their parties’ long-term political goals.96
Thus, a small minority of states can, through federal action, impose their
preferences on the others—contravening state coequality norms proposed by
some, rendering Wechsler’s safeguard counterproductive for many states and,
by fostering interstate discord, a serious threat to long-term structural
stability.97
These criticisms reproduce the puzzle of states’ continuing viability. One
well-known proposed solution is Larry Kramer’s argument that political parties
safeguard federalism by “creat[ing] a political culture in which members of
local, state, and national networks . . . work for the election of candidates at
every level”;98 federal officials thus learn of and have incentives to prioritize
state preferences.99 This results from American parties’ prioritizing elections
over policy programs and their decentralized structures, which connect “state
and local organizations” from across the nation “[with] a shared interest in the
outcome of national (and especially presidential) elections.”100 Party structure
promotes relationships and establishes obligations among officials
that cut across governmental planes. . . . [T]he obligation to support
party candidates [does not] end on election day, for staying in power
constrains successful candidates to work with their counterparts at
other levels. A member of Congress, even a President, will need to
help state officials either as a matter of party fellowship or in order to
shore up the willingness of state officials to offer support in the
future; the same thing is true in reverse. The whole process is one of

that constituents are rationally ignorant about federalism—they invest their time in pressing for substantive
policy outcomes rather than second-order structural issues—and thus are not likely to press federal
representatives to protect state interests); cf. Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1673–74 (2007) (presenting survey evidence suggesting some constituents do care about
federalism in itself). There are, of course, certain groups whose members care quite a bit about federalism in
the abstract—some early actions of the Tea Party spring to mind. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular
Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 487, 510–11 (2012).
96 Cf. Baker & Young, supra note 21, at 117 (discussing “horizontal aggrandizement”).
97 Id. at 117–18. See generally Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008)
(positing a constitutional norm of state coequality); James A. Gardner & Antoni Abad I Ninet, Sustainable
Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence, and Subnational Symmetry in the United States and
Spain, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 491 (2011) (emphasizing some problems associated with interstate conflicts).
98 Kramer, supra note 24, at 279.
99 See id. at 276–87; Kramer, supra note 90, at 1520–42.
100 Kramer, supra note 24, at 277–79 (footnote omitted); accord Kramer, supra note 90, at 1524.
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elaborate, if diffuse, reciprocity: of mutual dependency among party
101
and elected officials at different levels . . . .

The history of American parties suggests, moreover, that this network “has
proved to be remarkably durable and effective”—and thus may be a reliable
federalism safeguard.102
There are other views. Professor Clark argues that inertia in federal
lawmaking processes is a systemic federalism safeguard.103 The Supremacy
Clause makes federal encroachment on state power possible only through the
Article I legislative process,104 which, with its bicameralism and presentment
requirements and numerous “vetogates” at which minority interests can block
action, is resource- and time-intensive.105 State law is the constitutional default
in our system; thus, slowing the rate of preemptive federal lawmaking
preserves state regulatory authority.106 Article I, then, establishes a set of
“procedures [that] safeguard federalism.”107 Administrative law scholars
propose agency-centric accounts. One argument is that federal administrative
expansion is actually beneficial for federalism because agencies are better
equipped—as institutions—than Congress or courts to account for state
interests;108 another is that administrative law principles are on balance better
than existing judicial federalism doctrines for protecting state regulatory
power.109 Kramer argues that the many and varied cooperative federal–state
regulatory regimes make federal agencies similar to political parties in
fostering federal interaction with and dependence on the states, creating
additional pro-federalism incentives.110

101

Kramer, supra note 24, at 279.
Id. at 278.
103 See generally Clark, supra note 31 (arguing that the onerous federal lawmaking process safeguards
federalism by limiting the volume of potentially preemptive federal law).
104 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy
Clause, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1422–23 (2008).
105 See Clark, supra note 31, at 1339; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–48 (2008).
106 See Clark, supra note 31, at 1339; Young, supra note 23, at 89 (describing state law as the default
system); cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“‘[S]tart with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
107 Clark, supra note 31, at 1339.
108 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 30, at 1966–67 (highlighting institutional obstacles to Congress
fully considering state interests).
109 See Metzger, supra note 72, at 2109.
110 See Kramer, supra note 90, at 1520–29.
102
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These updated accounts better reflect current political realities, but critics
charge that Kramer ignores centralization in the parties that has diminished the
influence of state officials and party committees111 and that Clark’s view
incorporates no protection for states against nonlegislative federal enactments
that do not face the onerous Article I process.112 Administrative federalism
advocates draw criticism from conventional theorists who remain leery of
agency processes and preemptive federal regulations.113
A second set of arguments turn on different conceptions of the sort of state
power needed for stable federalism.114 Conventional theorists focus on state
regulatory autonomy—the power to regulate on some subjects without federal
interference.115 Others, however, emphasize states’ leverage in bargaining with
federal officials over practical power-allocation question that are not resolved
by the Constitution. Professor Ryan demonstrates that “federalism bargaining
permeates American govern[ment],” including in the following:
[F]amiliar forms of negotiation used in lawmaking (such as the
Stimulus), negotiations over various kinds of law enforcement (such
as immigration or pollution), negotiations under the federal spending
power (such as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001), and
negotiations for exceptions under otherwise applicable laws (such as
the Endangered Species Act) . . . [as well as] negotiated federal
rulemaking with state stakeholders (as was used to regulate
stormwater pollution), federal statutes that share policy design with
states (such as Medicaid), staggered programs of iterative shared
policymaking (as used to regulate auto emissions), and intersystemic
signaling negotiations, by which independently operating state and
federal actors trade influence over the direction of evolving
interjurisdictional policies (as reflected in medical marijuana
116
enforcement).

This highlights the role of lobbying organizations representing subnational
governments—the National Governors Association, National Conference of
111 See Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 980. For other criticisms, see Lynn A. Baker, Putting the
Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001); Baker & Young,
supra note 21, at 115; and Young, supra note 23, at 75–79.
112 See Young, supra note 23, at 89–90.
113 See, e.g., Benjamin & Young, supra note 75, at 2113–14; Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 869, 869 (2008) (maintaining that “[f]ederal administrative action is . . . threatening to state
autonomy” because federal agencies can directly affect state government power or autonomy without running
their decisions through something like the set of political checks that operate in Congress).
114 See Gerken, supra note 35, at 1553 (highlighting multiple forms of state power).
115 See, e.g., Young, supra note 23, at 51–63.
116 Ryan, supra note 35, at 7–8.
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State Legislatures, etc.—and other channels of federal–state bargaining in
reinforcing federalism.117 While these dynamics are largely overlooked in legal
scholarship, political scientists view them as important functional
safeguards.118 In principle, because state officials themselves are involved,
these mechanisms feature precisely the state institutional interests that are
missing from Wechsler’s theory,119 and they affect both the legislative and
implementation phases of the federal policy process—lobbying and negotiation
occur in Congress and in federal agencies.120 Significant intergovernmentallobby achievements include the devolutionary provisions of the Safe Drinking
Water Act reauthorization and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
framework for heightened congressional deliberation about legislation’s
federalism impacts.121 More recently, they helped secure $250 billion in
federal funding for state programs in the 2009 federal stimulus package122 and
won concessions for states in the Dodd-Frank Act.123
Relatedly, Professor Gerken focuses on the access and influence states
enjoy as crucial implementers of federal policy, which compensate for federal
resource constraints.124 Even where states lack regulatory autonomy or are
subservient participants in cooperative regimes, their implementation capacity
creates incentives for federal officials to accommodate state preferences and
has prompted changes in federal environmental and welfare programs, among
others.125 This form of state power is “interstitial and contingent on the
117

See generally NUGENT, supra note 29 (emphasizing intergovernmental lobby groups’ role in political
federalism).
118 See id. at 9.
119 See id. at 6–9; Pursley, supra note 64, at 572–76; Young, supra note 23, at 79.
120 See, e.g., NUGENT, supra note 29, at 144–45 (explaining lobbyists’ influence in the rewriting of the
Safe Drinking Water Act).
121 See Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f, 300j-25 (2006); Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012)); NUGENT, supra note 29, at 138–59 (discussing the
Safe Drinking Water Act); Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1495, 1498 (2008) (discussing the UMRA).
122 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in
scattered titles of the U.S.C.); ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40112, STATES AND PROPOSED
ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLANS (2009) (detailing the intergovernmental lobby influence in including state
assistance in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act); NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, STATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT (2009), available at http://arrm.org/
pdfs/ARRASTATEIMPLEMENTATION.pdf; Ryan, supra note 35, at 29–30.
123 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); Ryan, supra note 35, at 30–31.
124 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 30; Gerken, supra note 30, at 19, 40–41; Gerken, supra note
35, at 1553–60.
125 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 30, at 1274–82 (citing Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating
Commuters to Clear the Air: Some Difficulties in Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 27
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national government’s choice not to eliminate it”126—a “power of the servant”
that may extend from pre-enactment lobbying through the life of a program.127
This is not an exhaustive catalogue. Scholars also suggest that partisan
gerrymandering, state constitutional amendment processes, modern distrust of
bureaucracy, and fragmented public opinion, among other things, function as
nonjudicial federalism safeguards.128 Despite disagreements about the details,
however, few deny the existence of nonjudicial safeguards—developments like
the UMRA strongly suggest that they exist—and it is unlikely that courts alone
could preserve federalism.129
None of these accounts seems complete in itself: Each mechanism has profederalism effects and they interact to form a complex system operating across
governmental processes to sustain states’ structural presence.130 Federal and
state officials connected through party networks may also work together in
cooperative regulatory settings; state officials may gain clout within parties
through successful intergovernmental lobbying and, thus, may become national
candidates or party leaders; sitting members of Congress depend on party
networks for future electoral support; and so forth.131 Some mechanisms
depend on political contingencies rather than anything constitutionally

PAC. L.J. 1521, 1556–61 (1996)) (describing instances of state resistance to federal directives in the context of
cooperative regimes that prompted changes in national policy); Gerken, supra note 35, at 1558 (giving
examples of federal dependence on state governments to implement federal programs); Ryan, supra note 35, at
31–36, 78–81 (highlighting state bargaining in cooperative regimes).
126 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 35, at 1268. A more controversial possibility is that states might
resist or disobey federal implementation directives and shape federal programs more directly according to state
preferences—Gerken’s “uncooperative federalism.” See id. at 1292. There is little doubt that states’
implementation resources are sufficiently important to insulate such actions from federal reprisal in some
contexts; but this treads a bit closer than is comfortable to the outer limit of what is permissible on my view of
our structural norms. See Pursley, supra note 68, at 512–19 (hypothesizing an implied preclusion of state
action that undermines the constitutional structure).
127 See Gerken, supra note 35, at 1556–64; accord Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 35, at 1292.
128 See John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendment Processes and the Safeguards of American
Federalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1007 (2011) (characterizing state constitutional amendments as a form of
federalism safeguard); Mikos, supra note 95, at 1673–74 (noting that voters’ distrust of federal bureaucracy
can function as a sort of federalism safeguard); Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 862 (arguing that in some circumstances state power to draw federal
legislative districts can serve to reinforce state autonomy).
129 See Young, supra note 23, at 79.
130 See BEDNAR, supra note 35, at 96; Bednar, supra note 35, at 270; cf. RYAN, supra note 36, at 266–67;
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 70, at 56; Ryan, supra note 36, at 4–5; Young, supra note 23, at 9 (describing
federalism as a “web of relationships”).
131 See Kramer, supra note 24, at 285–86.
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mandatory,132 but this distinction matters little for assessing the system’s
present stability. Contingent and mandatory mechanisms interact—this makes
the system stronger, but also means that undermining one mechanism may
have outsized consequences for others and for the system as a whole.133 The
distinction may, however, matter for the normative implications of political
change. Contingent mechanisms naturally change over time; erosion of
mandatory mechanisms may be a constitutional violation.134
II. DISRUPTING THE SYSTEM
One of the most significant changes in national politics in recent decades is
the expansion of independent expenditures by outside groups—not campaign
contributions,135 but spending outside the control of candidates or parties—to
influence federal elections.136 All nonjudicial federalism safeguards depend on
stable political processes in which states retain influence—they depend, in
other words, on the existence of durable incentives for federal officials to take
state interests seriously. The unprecedented explosion of independent spending
following Citizens United threatens these conditions and, thus, threatens the
system.
Unregulated independent expenditures should worry federalism theorists
for the same reason that it worries advocates of campaign finance regulation:
Those capable of spending large amounts to elect candidates exercise outsized
influence in government.137 That, in itself, might be viewed as a form of

132

See Young, supra note 23, at 74–75.
See VERMEULE, supra note 36, at 30 (discussing nonlinear causation in complex systems); supra notes
35–36 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text.
135 Expenditures that are coordinated with campaigns are deemed contributions subject to federal
contribution limitations, which survive Citizens United for campaigns and parties. See FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 464 (2001). It’s difficult to police coordination; thus the
dissolution of independent expenditure limitations may functionally dissolve contribution limits as well. See
Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 659 n.160
(2000).
136 The Federal Election Campaigns Act (FECA) defines “independent expenditure” as “an
expenditure . . . expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and . . . that is not
made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s
authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(17)
(2012); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2012).
137 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 125 n.13 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., 352 U.S. 567, 577–78 (1957) (quoting 86 CONG. REC. 2720 (1940)); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti133
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corruption requiring regulation; but even under the narrower view of
corruption adopted in Citizens United, there remains an obvious interestmismatch problem138: Those with the resources to spend lavishly on campaignrelated activities tend to be wealthy individuals and organizations. Public
choice theory suggests that these spenders often have preferences that conflict
with the general public interest.139 So, too, their preferences—for cost-reducing
regulatory standardization or deregulation, in particular—often will conflict
with states’ interests in continuing regulatory power. In this Part, I describe
how Citizens United and its progeny deregulate outside electoral spending,
making it possible for outside-group influence to grow without limit. The
power of money in politics is a longstanding concern; but the world is
categorically different now—federal law after Citizens United funnels large
amounts of money away from party control to independent groups empowered
to build enormous influence over specific candidates by spending without limit
to directly advocate for their election.140 As this new form of independent
spending becomes increasingly central to campaign strategy—and Super PACs
already were the primary ad buyers in the 2012 Republican presidential
primary141—it will expand channels of influence over federal officeholders for
interests potentially hostile to state autonomy.142 This could bring down the
system of federalism if outside groups become significant enough in national
campaigns to replace—or significantly diminish—the influence of state
governments and their advocates in national political parties, lobbies, and other
settings.

Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 387–97 (2009) (assessing various corruption-related
rationales for campaign finance regulation).
138 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
139 Mancur Olson’s work is seminal and at the foundation of public choice theory. See generally MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) [hereinafter
OLSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION] (arguing that interest group influence can explain most governmental action
such that references to the pursuit of national interests may be misleading); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 67–74 (1982) [hereinafter
OLSON, NATIONS] (arguing that political groups’ narrow agendas frequently run counter to broadly shared
public interests). For a foundational treatment of the implications of public choice insights for law, see DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 22–30 (1991); for
discussion of public choice dynamics in elections, see Luis Roniger, Political Clientelism, Democracy, and
Market Economy, 36 COMP. POL. 353, 354 (2004) (book review).
140 See infra Part III.B.
141 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Campaigns Grow More Dependent on ‘Super PAC’ Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2012, at A1; Jeremy W. Peters, ‘Super PACs,’ Not Campaigns, Do Bulk of Ad Spending, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2012, at A10.
142 See infra Part III.A.
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A. Federal Campaign Finance Law—FECA to BCRA
Citizens United changed the regulatory landscape for outside groups that
wish to spend money to influence elections, and, therefore, the structure of
electoral politics.143 At issue was a provision of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA)144 that prohibited corporations and unions from spending
general treasury funds on “electioneering communications”—communications
that expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate proximate to an
election date.145 This expanded a provision of the 1972 Federal Election
Campaigns Act (FECA)146 that precluded corporations and unions from using
general treasury funds for campaign contributions or independent expenditures
underwriting “express advocacy”—famously defined by the Court as a
communication containing certain “magic words” indicating the sponsor’s
preference regarding a particular federal candidate.147
Corporations and unions have been subject to campaign spending
restrictions of one form or another for the better part of a century.148 Citizens
United did not alter existing contribution limits on outside groups,
corporations, or unions.149 The dramatic spending increases in recent decades
have come in the form of independent expenditures.150 The legal status of
independent expenditures has developed in part as a function of the
development of the law governing corporate and union campaign spending.
Corporations have not, however, been politically hobbled—they have long
been permitted to form political action committees—“separate, segregated
fund[s] to be utilized for political purposes,” including making contributions to
candidates and parties and independently funding express advocacy.151
143 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 1683–87 (arguing that contribution limits are, after Citizens United,
“functionally meaningless” such that the campaign finance environment now resembles the so-called Wild
West).
144 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
145 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i), 441b(b)(2), 441b(c)(1) (2012).
146 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
147 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52, 45 (1976).
148 See Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (banning corporate and union contributions).
149 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349–51 (2010); Briffault, supra note 8, at 1678; Samuel
Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 125 (2010).
150 See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
151 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2); see also Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86
Stat. 3, 10 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)) (containing the original Taft Hartley provision
covering PACs); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 450 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); cf. United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 123 (1948) (reading a PAC exception
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Contributions to PACs are limited both by source and in amount—PACs may
solicit only from the shareholders, executives, and administrative personnel of
the underlying corporation and, in some instances, their family members, and
those contributions are limited to $5,000 per year.152 There are no limits on
PACs’ independent spending.153 Thus through PACs, corporations could do—
somewhat indirectly—some of the things that federal campaign finance law
barred them from doing directly before Citizens United.154
FECA, as amended in 1974, also imposed general restrictions on
contributions to candidates and parties and on independent
“expenditure[s] . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate”155 by individuals,
groups, candidates and parties for election-related activity; imposed reporting
and disclosure requirements for campaign spending; created a public financing
system for presidential elections; and, among other things, created the Federal
Election Commission (FEC).156 The Supreme Court assessed FECA’s
constitutionality against a First Amendment challenge in Buckley v. Valeo.157 It
upheld the contribution limitations based on the government interest in
preventing “quid pro quo corruption”—meaning the direct exchange of
campaign money for votes or favors158—as did the Court in Citizens United.159
But the Court struck down FECA’s expenditure limitations, concluding that
“[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given
as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”160
Although Buckley did not squarely address the constitutionality of FECA’s
ban on independent corporate and union campaign spending, the Court did
into Taft Hartley); Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After
Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 647–48 (2011).
152 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C), 441b(b)(4)(B).
153 Briffault, supra note 151, at 647.
154 See id. at 647–48.
155 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, 1265
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
156 See id. §§ 101, 201, 310–311, 406; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441a; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12–13
(1976) (describing FECA); Press Release, FEC, FEC Announces 2011-12 Campaign Cycle Contribution
Limits (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.fec.gov/press/20110203newlimits.shtml (discussing general contribution
limits).
157 See 424 U.S. at 13–14, 29.
158 See id. at 26–28; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (discussing “quid pro quo
corruption”).
159 See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (2011) (reaffirming
the constitutionality of “government-imposed limits on contributions to candidates” after Citizens United).
160 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
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indirectly narrow the ban’s scope.161 To avoid overbreadth, the Buckley Court
construed FECA’s reporting and disclosure requirements—and by implication
the ban on corporate and union spending—to apply only to express
advocacy—communications directly advocating the election or defeat of a
specific, clearly identified candidate.162 Express advocacy, the Court explained
in a footnote, could be distinguished by its use of words like “‘vote for,’
‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’
‘defeat,’ [and] ‘reject.’”163 This interpretation gave rise to “issue advocacy”—
the creation of campaign-related communications carefully designed to fall
outside Buckley’s technical definition of “express advocacy,” and thus outside
the scope of FECA’s spending and disclosure requirements.164 Issue ads are
often functionally indistinguishable from express advocacy from the voters’
perspective165—they could “advocate the election . . . of clearly identified
federal candidates” so long as they avoided using the magic words, but there is
“[l]ittle difference . . . , for example, between an ad that urged viewers to ‘vote
against Jane Doe’ and one that condemned Jane Doe’s record on a particular
issue before exhorting viewers to ‘call Jane Doe and tell her what you
think.’”166 Thus PACs, corporations, unions, and other groups could spend
unlimited sums on issue ads without running afoul of FECA restrictions—
though they could not collect contributions over FECA caps167—so long as the
ads were not coordinated with federal candidates or instances of express
advocacy.168 Issue-ad spending exploded before the BCRA was enacted—
rising from about $135 million in the 1996–1997 election cycle to $500 million

161 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310;
Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 588–89 (2011).
162 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80).
163 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126 (dubbing Buckley’s list of express
advocacy hallmark terms the “magic words”). Most lower federal courts read Buckley’s “magic words” as a
requirement for campaign activity to be considered “express advocacy” subject to FECA’s requirements. See
Richard Briffault, Soft Money Reform and the Constitution, 1 ELECTION L.J. 343, 351 & n.67 (2002) (citing, as
an example of the common approach, FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997), but
also citing FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), finding an instance of express advocacy without the
“magic words”).
164 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126–28; Hasen, supra note 161, at 588–89.
165 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126–27.
166 Id.
167 See id. at 122–26.
168 Id. at 128. Issue ads are treated as contributions under FECA regulations if coordinated with federal
candidates or campaigns. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (2012); Briffault, supra note 135, at 624–25.
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in 1999–2000.169 Nevertheless, direct electioneering was still controlled by the
parties, whose capacity was dramatically expanded by soft money.170
FECA defines contributions as donations “made by any person for the
purpose of influencing any election for Federal office”171 and requires that
spending on federal-election activity by or coordinated with campaigns or
parties be funded by contributions—“hard” money.172 Another FECA loophole
developed in the late 1970s, when the FEC, in part at the urging of state party
committees,173 ruled that party committees could fund “mixed-purpose”
election-related activities—activities that benefit the party ticket, including
both state and federal candidates, as a whole—with “soft” money raised
outside FECA’s dollar and source limitations.174 These rulings and a 1979
FECA amendment exempting state and local party-building activities from
hard money requirements175 combined to allow state parties to collect
unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations, unions, PACs, and
other nonparty/candidate donors to fund a wide variety of state and local partybuilding and campaign activities—other than express advocacy—even if they
benefit state and federal candidates.176 Soft money contributions were limited
only by FEC regulations specifying permissible apportionment of hard and soft
money177 and state campaign finance laws, many of which were more lenient

169

See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127 n.20.
See id. at 124–26.
171 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
172 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122; see Briffault, supra note 135, at 628.
173 See Briffault, supra note 135, at 629 (noting that “[i]n the late 1970s, various state party committees
began to press the FEC to allow them to use funds that did not comply with FECA to partially finance
campaign efforts that help the party ticket as a whole, including both federal and state candidates”).
174 See FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17 (July 16, 1979), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/aonum.jsp?
AONUM=1979-17; FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (Aug 29, 1978), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/
aonum.jsp?AONUM=1978-10; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123; L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., IB98025, CAMPAIGN FINANCE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOFT MONEY 2 (2004); Stephen
Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 598,
598–99 (2000); Briffault, supra note 163, at 345.
175 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(x), (xii) (1982) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(x), (xi) (2012)).
176 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122–23 & n.7. FEC regulations allowed parties to apportion administrative
mixed-purpose activity expenses on a reasonable basis between hard-money accounts and accounts containing
soft money. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.6 (2013); FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17 (July 16, 1979), available at http://saos.
nictusa.com/saos/aonum.jsp?AONUM=1979-17; FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (Aug 29, 1978), available at
http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/aonum.jsp?AONUM=1978-10.
177 National parties could fund forty percent of most mixed-purpose activities with soft money in years
other than presidential election years and thirty-five percent of such activities with soft money in presidential
election years, see 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(2); state party committees could combine hard and soft money based
on the ratio of federal to nonfederal offices on their ballots, see id. § 106.5(d)(1) (repealed 2002), “which in
170
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than FECA.178 Soft money grew modestly in the 1980s,179 but began to surge
after a 1995 FEC decision permitting the parties to use soft money for issue
ads180: It increased from $86 million in the 1992 election cycle to about $225
million in 1998,181 leveling off at about $500 to $600 million in 2000 and
2002.182 Importantly for our purposes, the national parties channeled
significant soft money through state party committees because state parties
could use more soft money for campaign activities, infrastructure, and “shared
voter mobilization programs such as direct mail campaigns and phone bank
operations” that could benefit both state and federal candidates.183
The 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act closed the soft-money loophole
almost entirely—barring (1) national-party and federal-candidate solicitation
and use of soft money, including fundraising on behalf of outside groups; (2)
contributions of soft money to state or local parties for “federal election
activity”; and (3) state candidates’ use of soft money to fund electioneering
communications.184 It exempts donations to state or local party committees of
up to $10,000 per year for party-building activity that does not refer to a
practice meant that they could expend a substantially greater proportion of soft money than national parties to
fund mixed-purpose activities affecting both federal and state elections.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123 n.7.
178 See Briffault, supra note 135, at 628–29; see also MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY
AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 10, 16–17 (1998).
179 See Briffault, supra note 135, at 629–30 (noting that soft money grew faster in the 1990s than in the
1980s).
180 See FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25 (Aug. 24, 1995), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao?
AONUMBER=1995-25; Briffault, supra note 135, at 630–31; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124 (“As the
permissible uses of soft money expanded, the amount of soft money raised and spent by the national political
parties increased exponentially. Of the two major parties’ total spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6
million) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42%
($498 million) in 2000.”).
181 See Briffault, supra note 135, at 630 (citing Press Release, FEC, FEC Reports on Political Party
Activity for 1997–98 (Apr. 9, 1999), http://www.fec.gov/press/ptyye98.htm; Press Release, FEC, Political
Party Fundraising Continues to Climb (Jan. 26, 1999), http://www.fec.gov/press/press1999/pty3098.htm).
182 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124 & n.8; Stephen R. Weissman & Ruth Hassan, BCRA and the 527
Groups, in THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT
79, 81 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006) (“[T]he national parties raised $496 million in soft money in the 2002
cycle; and state parties raised an estimated $95 million in soft money for federal elections in the same cycle.”);
Katharine Q. Seelye, Senate Democrats Surpassed G.O.P. in Soft Money in 2000, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001,
at A1.
183 Briffault, supra note 135, at 629; accord McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124; Nathaniel Persily, Soft Money
and Slippery Slopes, 1 ELECTION L.J. 401, 406–08 (2002) (highlighting the complex interconnections of
national and state party finance as a significant obstacle to the effectiveness of the BCRA).
184 See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)–(f) (2012). Cutting soft money cut into the parties’ newly expanded resources.
Cf. Briffault, supra note 135, at 626 (“The parties . . . have done well under FECA. They raise far more money
than ever before, and they are playing a growing role in the financing of federal election campaigns.”). I
discuss this consequence in more detail infra, Part III.B.
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clearly identified federal candidate.185 The provision barring the use of
corporate or union treasury funds for electioneering communications—
broadcast communications targeted at constituents of clearly identified federal
candidates thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general
election186—closes the sham issue-ad loophole.187
Congress enacted the BCRA during a period in which the Supreme Court
appeared to be moving away from the jurisprudential core of Buckley188: The
Court gradually expanded the category of government interests justifying
campaign finance regulations beyond Buckley’s narrow focus on quid pro quo
corruption.189 For example, the Court upheld a Michigan prohibition on
corporate expenditures in state elections in view of the government’s interest in
precluding “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas.”190 Three later decisions made clear that this expanded definition of
“corruption” includes “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with
the wishes of large contributors,”191 and identified restrictions on both

185

See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iii).
Id. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i). Corporations may still fund issue advertising through PACs, McConnell, 540
U.S. at 204, but the provision expands disclosure and reporting requirements to anyone spending over a
threshold amount on electioneering communications, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1).
187 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132; Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of
Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 700–01 (2012); Hasen, supra note 161, at 588. Under FECA, an
“independent expenditure” is one that funds a communication “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate” not coordinated with candidates or parties. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17). The BCRA’s
“electioneering communication” category is both broader, encompassing any radio or television
communications that “refer[] to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” rather than just instances of
express advocacy, and narrower, including only communications targeted to the candidate’s constituency and
aired less than thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general election. Id. § 434(f)(3)(A); see
Briffault, supra, at 686.
188 See Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the
Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1730 (2001) (canvassing cases); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead,
Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 39–46 (2004) (collecting cases); Kang, supra note 10, at 4 (“The definition of
corruption had subtly but unmistakably expanded under the Rehnquist Court to permit a wide range of
campaign finance regulation ranging from contribution limits to various restrictions on corporate and union
spending to prohibitions on party soft money.”); Teachout, supra note 137, at 387–97 (collecting cases).
189 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204–05.
190 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); accord FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) (noting the
advantages of corporations in accumulating political influence and the particular dangers of corporate financial
influence in politics).
191 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
186

PURSLEY GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

4/3/2014 2:50 PM

CAMPAIGN FINANCE SAFEGUARDS

813

coordinated party–PAC expenditures and corporate campaign contributions as
permissible responses to that threat.192
This new approach reached its apex in McConnell v. FEC.193 The
McConnell Court upheld the BCRA’s soft-money restrictions as permissible
implementations of Buckley’s quid-pro-quo-corruption interest194 as well as
strong governmental interests in precluding wealthy donors from gaining
“undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment,”195 preventing the
“appearance of corruption” created by “the selling of access,”196 preventing
“the corrosive and distorting effects of” corporate wealth on the political
process,197 and “preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution
limits.”198 The Court suggested that holding permissible only regulations
targeted at quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, to the exclusion of these
other interests, defies “common sense[] and the realities of political
fundraising.”199 Thus the Court accorded substantial deference to Congress’s
conclusions—for example, regarding the potential for state and local parties, or
tax-exempt political organizations, to replace national party committees as
“conduits” by which money might influence federal elections despite federal
regulations.200
In upholding the BCRA’s provision barring sham issue ads, the Court cited
FECA’s corporate spending bar as proof that “Congress’ power to prohibit
corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance
advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in
federal elections [is] firmly embedded.”201 The Court further held that its
expanded list of election-related government interests—especially those
suggesting that “the special characteristics of the corporate structure require
192 See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
(Colorado Republican II), 533 U.S.431, 452 (2001).
193 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 147–85 (describing the soft-money provisions); id. at 202–11 (assessing
the BCRA’s electioneering-communications provisions).
194 See id. at 145, 150–52 (citing examples of actual corruption—“[t]he evidence connects soft money to
manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ failure to enact, among other things, generic
drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation”).
195 Id. at 143 (quoting Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 441) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196 Id. at 145, 154.
197 Id. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
198 Id. at 185; see id. at 188–89 (issuing holding).
199 Id. at 152.
200 Id. at 174 (tax exempt organizations); id. at 185 (holding that restricting contributions to tax-exempt
entities is justifiable to preclude circumvention of soft-money limits).
201 Id. at 203.
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particularly careful regulation”—justified barring independent corporate and
union funding of electioneering communications, including sham issue ads.202
The Court deferred to Congress’s findings that corporations and unions were
using their general treasuries “to finance a virtual torrent of televised electionrelated ads during the periods immediately preceding federal elections,” and it
joined Congress in concluding that most of these “are the functional equivalent
of express advocacy” under Buckley.203
B. Citizens United and the Birth of Super PACs
After McConnell, campaign finance doctrine moved dramatically back in
Buckley’s direction.204 Among other things, the Roberts Court invalidated state
contribution limits as overly stringent205 and narrowed the BCRA’s restriction
on electioneering communications to apply only to communications
functionally identical to Buckley’s “express advocacy”—communications
“susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for
or against a specific candidate.”206 McConnell was then fully repudiated in
Citizens United, where the Court invalidated all federal restrictions on
independent expenditures by corporations and unions.207 The reasoning of
Citizens United is more important than its immediate effect on corporate
campaign spending.208 The majority expressly rejected McConnell’s broader
“access corruption” model and held that campaign finance restrictions are only
justifiable based on the governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption.209 The Court thus easily concluded that independent
202

Id. at 203–05 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. at 205–07. The Court here was responding to an overbreadth challenge, such that the “functional
equivalent” language goes to the scope of regulation permitted by the relevant governmental interests, not
necessarily to the existence of the governmental interests—a burden analysis, in other words. In the Wisconsin
Right to Life cases, however, the Roberts Court converted this language into the criterion for a legitimate
governmental interest in regulation. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 455–82
(2007).
204 See Hasen, supra note 161, at 589–90 (arguing that this may be because Justices Roberts and Alito
joined the Court).
205 See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740–44 (2008); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245–46 (2006).
206 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 469–70.
207 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010). The decision invalidates more than twenty
similar state laws by implication. See Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.
ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx (last updated Jan. 4, 2011).
208 See Kang, supra note 10, at 4–5; Overton, supra note 20, at 1264; see also Briffault, supra note 151, at
650 (arguing that Citizens United’s deregulation of corporate campaign spending is relatively insignificant
because the WRTL II decision basically did that).
209 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. See generally WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 478–79 (“This Court has
long recognized ‘the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption’ in
203
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expenditures—which by definition do not involve exchanges with
candidates—“do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption”
and, therefore, cannot be regulated.210 In rejecting McConnell’s focus on the
potential for wealthy interests to gain undue influence over candidates even
without direct contact, the Court stated that influence is endemic to the
democratic process: “Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in
representative politics. . . . [A] substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only
reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over
another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political
outcomes the supporter favors.”211
A familiar metaphor is that campaign finance is “hydraulic”—“political
money, like water, has to go somewhere,”212 and it will typically flow into the
least regulated channel to the relevant objective.213 After the BCRA’s ban on
parties’ use of soft money was upheld in McConnell, many soft-money donors
shifted their contributions from the parties to outside groups, including taxexempt “527” and “501(c)” organizations that can engage in federal election
activity without satisfying the requirements applicable to registered political
committees.214 Some focus on issue advocacy, but most engage in some
combination of independent electioneering and “ground-game” activities like
canvassing, voter registration, direct mail, turnout operations, and so forth.215
The 527 groups replaced parties as the preferred vehicle for unregulated
campaign contributions and spending—taking in much of what would have
flowed to parties as soft money before the BCRA.216 The 2004 election cycle

election campaigns. . . . Issue ads like WRTL’s are by no means equivalent to contributions, and the quid-proquo corruption interest cannot justify regulating them.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976))
(citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204–06 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310)).
210 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357–58.
211 Id. at 359 (first omission in original) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
212 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 1708.
213 Kang, supra note 10, at 5.
214 See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949,
950 (2005); Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign Finance Environment:
The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 245–50 (2004);
Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 120.
215 See Holman & Claybrook, supra note 214, at 247.
216 See id. at 247 (noting that 527s “had been the favorite vehicle for special interest groups seeking to
influence federal elections, especially prior to the 527-disclosure law of 2000”). Briffault notes that some soft
money was not redirected—corporations instead reduced political spending because outside groups could not
provide access like parties. See Briffault, supra note 214, at 962–65.
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was “the ‘[s]ummer of the 527s’”217—tax-exempt organizations spent over
$400 million, or about ten percent of total spending and nearly twenty-five
percent of spending on the presidential contest, during that period.218 After
disclosure requirements were put in place for 527 groups, the 501(c)
designation became more attractive.219 Because 501(c) groups must have a
“primary purpose” other than electoral activity, they are not subject to FECA
disclosure requirements.220 However, most 501(c) groups are corporations;
thus, until Citizens United, they were subject to corporate spending restrictions
and had to rely on capped contributions or PAC activities.221 Despite the softmoney period and the growth of tax-status groups after McConnell, “the softmoney and electioneering communications provisions of BCRA . . . to a
considerable degree restored the post-Watergate era campaign finance
structure” and, despite their activity in 2004, outside groups were “peripheral”
such that “[t]he 2008 presidential election largely abided by the post-Watergate
rules, supplemented by BCRA.”222 In short, the growth of outside-group
influence during these periods had been staunched, and something like the
FECA baseline regulatory environment restored, until Citizens United.
The Citizens United Court’s conclusion that only the interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption justifies regulation prompted additional deregulation.
The D.C. Circuit, relying on that reasoning, held in mid-2010 that political
committees making only independent expenditures may accept unlimited
contributions from individuals.223 The court exempted such groups from the
$5,000 limit on contributions to PACs224 on the ground that independent

217

Briffault, supra note 214, at 950 (alteration in original).
See id. at 961; Weissman & Hassan, supra note 182, at 103–04 (noting that total 527 expenditure in
2004 was $398.5 million, a significant increase from 2002). Of the roughly $4 billion spent by all groups on
the 2004 presidential campaign, 527 spending accounted for about one-tenth. See Briffault, supra note 214, at
961.
219 Briffault, supra note 187, at 685–86; Holman & Claybrook, supra note 214, at 248–49.
220 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012); Holman & Claybrook, supra note 214, at 247, 252 (labeling this the
“primary purpose” requirement). The primary-purpose criterion parallels the Court’s holding in Buckley that
only organizations whose “major purpose” is to nominate or elect a federal candidate are “political
committees” under FECA. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
221 See Briffault, supra note 187, at 685; see also Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision
Dramatically Affects Political Landscape, OPENSECRETS.ORG (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.
opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html
(follow
link; then go to the third slide of the slideshow) (estimating that 501(c) groups spent $78.95 million in 2008
and $134.43 million in 2010).
222 Briffault, supra note 8, at 1683.
223 See SpeechNow.org. v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
224 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2012).
218
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electoral activity cannot give rise to quid pro quo corruption.225 The FEC
quickly followed with advisory opinions allowing corporations and unions to
contribute to independent-expenditure-only committees in unlimited
amounts.226 Super PACs were born.
Unlike 527 and 501(c) entities, Super PACs are political committees
subject to FECA;227 but they benefit from the combined effect of Citizens
United and the post–Citizens United deregulatory rulings permitting them to
collect unlimited donations from any source and spend unlimited amounts on
independent election-related activity.228 While there is still no formal
regulation specific to Super PACs,229 FEC guidance establishes that they
cannot contribute to or coordinate with federal campaigns.230 However,
coordination is difficult to police and Super PACs have informal connections
with candidates: Among other things, candidates and officeholders raise
money for Super PACs;231 their former staffers often run Super PACs;
campaigns and Super PACs hire the same consultants;232 Super PACs can use
footage of candidates in their ads, including footage lifted from campaign
225 See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 695–97; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357–61
(2010) (relying on the same reasoning).
226 See FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11 (July 22, 2010), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/aonum.jsp?
AONUM=2010-11; FEC Advisory Op. 2010-09 (July 22, 2010), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/
aonum.jsp?AONUM=2010-09.
227 See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6–9 (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf; Briffault,
supra note 8, at 1645–50.
228 See GARRETT, supra note 227, at 6–9.
229 The FEC issued Notices of Proposed Rulemaking that would specifically regulate Super PACs, but has
deadlocked or voted them down so far. See FEC Agenda Document No. 11-39, Minutes of an Open Meeting of
the Federal Election Commission (June 15, 2011), http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2011/mtgdoc_1139.pdf (noting
that the FEC rejected on a 4–2 vote NPRM 11-33 and deadlocked on NPRM 11-33-A ); FEC Agenda
Document No. 11-06, Minutes of an Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://fec.gov/agenda/2011/approved2011_06.pdf (noting that the FEC deadlocked on both NPRM 11-02,
Draft A, and NPRM 11-02-A).
230 See GARRETT, supra note 227, at 3, 4 tbl.1. Coordinated activities constitute campaign contributions
under FECA and FEC regulations. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B) (2012) (defining coordination); see also 11
C.F.R. § 109.21 (2012).
231 See FEC Advisory Op. 2011-12 (June 30, 2011), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/aonum.jsp?
AONUM=2011-12.
232 Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Fine Line Between ‘Super PACs’ and Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2012, at A1 (noting crossovers); Andy Kroll, Candidates and the Totally Unrelated Super-PACs That Love
Them, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 20, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/01/stephen-colbertcitizens-united-super-pac (noting that Super PACs are frequently staffed with former staff of candidates or
party leaders and sometimes even family members); Martina Stewart, Super PACs’ Money Could Tip Balance
of Power in Congress, CNN (Jan. 26, 2012, 2:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/26/politics/super-pacgeneral (noting mechanisms of informal coordination).
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ads;233 and some campaign plans have been posted online for anyone—
including Super PACs—to view and follow.234
Super PACs frequently circumvent the relatively weak federal disclosure
requirements for political committees235—donations through shell corporations
with vague names or to affiliated nonprofits are common as Super PACs need
only disclose the corporation’s name.236 For example, American Crossroads
Grassroots Political Strategies (GPS), a 501(c)(4) nonprofit, runs the
“American Crossroads” Super PAC. The nonprofit can accept unlimited
donations, protect the donors’ identities, and transfer the money to the Super
PAC to spend, avoiding the primary-purpose restriction.237 “[L]ess than half of
the independent expenditures by outside groups during the 2010 election cycle
were made with disclosure of the contributors’ identities,” in part because
“outside groups have great incentives to avoid . . . disclosure when contributors
prefer anonymity, and particularly when the independent expenditures are the
type of inflammatory rhetoric that these groups are willing at times to
sponsor.”238 Easy anonymity may therefore incentivize ideologically extreme
campaign activity.
As professor Kang summarizes,
[P]ost-Citizens United, outside groups that engage in forthright and
extensive campaigning, in the form of independent expenditures,
operate entirely outside campaign finance regulation as it had existed
for more than thirty years since Buckley. The three major pillars of
campaign finance law—(1) source restrictions on corporations and
unions; (2) contribution limits; and (3) disclosure of contributors and
239
contributions—do not apply to them.

233

See Briffault, supra note 8, at 1681.
See Kang, supra note 10, at 37 (“[I]n 2010 . . . the National Republican Congressional Committee
publicly revealed its advertisement-buying strategy” allowing “Republican-allied groups, led by the United
States Chamber of Commerce, to coordinate their own ad buys.”).
235 See Briffault, supra note 187, at 686–88, 691–93; Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of
Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 557–58 (2012).
236 See Briffault, supra note 187, at 686–88; Nicholas Confessore, Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, In
G.O.P. Race, A New Breed of Superdonor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at A1 (discussing megadonor gifts
“through limited liability companies” with names like “F8 LLC, a company whose listed address in Utah leads
to an accounting firm”).
237 See American Crossroads, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.
php?cmte=C00487363 (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
238 Kang, supra note 10, at 49–50.
239 Id. at 35.
234
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Super PACs’ election-related expenditures in 2010 totaled about $62.6 million,
and in 2012 totaled about $609 million—an almost tenfold increase and
roughly two-thirds of all independent electoral spending in 2012.240 “Dark
money”—money for which the donor cannot be identified—appears to have
roughly tripled in 2012 to about $400 million, or more than thirty-five percent
of all outside spending.241
III. SUPER PAC POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
The rise of Super PACs and outside spending is the most significant
development in American politics in a generation.242 All theories of political
safeguards of federalism depend to some degree on the states’ clout in the
national lawmaking process. If interest group influence is to some extent zerosum, such that loyalty to private interests that provide substantial campaign
resources will displace loyalty to state-promoting interests, then increased
outside-group influence has negative consequences for all pro-federalism
political mechanisms. Increased private-interest capture of federal officials
disrupts the representational relationships between officials and the geographic
constituencies that push them to safeguard state interests in Wechsler’s
view.243 The increased capacity of outside groups to support federal candidates
also threatens to marginalize political parties—especially state and local party
committees—undermining Kramer’s institutional latticework for transmitting
state concerns to federal officials. And enhanced access to federal candidates
and officials because of increased campaign spending gives outside groups and
their donors a competitive advantage over state lobbying organizations and
state officials pressing state interests at various points in the policymaking
process. While I focus on these three mechanisms—constituent pressure,
parties, and intergovernmental lobbies—other political safeguards of
240

See Imus, supra note 2 (discussing Super PAC spending as a percentage of all spending); Super PACs,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Mar. 8, 2014);
Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2010 (last visited
Mar. 8, 2014).
241 See Paul Blumenthal, ‘Dark Money’ in 2012 Election Tops $400 Million, 10 Candidates Outspent by
Groups with Undisclosed Donors, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/11/02/dark-money-2012-election-400-million_n_2065689.html?view=print&comm_ref=false
(reporting the figures).
242 See Bowie & Lioz, supra note 3 (citing statistics showing the increased political influence of Super
PACs and outside spending).
243 See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 546 (arguing that federal legislators’ geographic constituents will press
for state preferences); see also Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 196–97 (2012) (explaining how lobbyists direct public policy by channeling resources to officials);
Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 127–33.
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federalism cannot help but be affected by this kind of tectonic shift in electoral
politics. The political-safeguard systems’ complexity and integration with
other political dynamics suggests that such a perturbation may create outsized
systemic consequences.
A. Incentives to Accommodate State Preferences
The dramatic increase in outside electoral spending occasioned by Citizens
United and its progeny may erode the relationship between federal candidates
and their geographic constituencies. Wechsler’s view depends on those
constituents’ interests in the health of their state governments providing
reelection incentives for federal officeholders to make federalism-conscious
policy decisions.244 If outside spending squeezes out the voices of local
constituents—perhaps by providing so much campaign support that little actual
constituent service is needed for reelection245—then Wechsler’s safeguard is
undermined. There is now a literature on the reasons Wechsler’s view is no
longer persuasive—some argue that voters are uninformed about federalism;
others that they simply do not care because their focus is increasingly on
national issues or their substantive policy preferences reliably trump any
structural preference.246 A recent study indicates that some voters may care
more about federalism than these critical accounts suggest, particularly in
election years;247 but even if there remains something to Wechsler’s
mechanism, Super PACs threaten to undermine it decisively for the reasons I
discuss here.248 Another problem is that officials do not reliably prioritize their
constituents’ views over those of supportive interest groups. As independent
expenditures have become functionally equivalent to direct contributions, we
should expect them to generate influence for donors proportional to their
244 Wechsler, supra note 26, at 546. Federal candidates are durably dependent on state governments to
draw congressional districts and conduct presidential primaries. Id. at 548–56. But it is not clear how
significant this is relative to dependence on providers of significant campaign funding. The latter is, of course,
more immediate, and the former is determined not just by the state government’s feelings about any particular
federal candidate but by a large set of factors that may not be sensitive to changes in candidates’ policy
priorities.
245 See generally Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010) (collecting sources for the
proposition that television commercials are perceived as more effective than other means of voter persuasion).
246 See, e.g., Devins, supra note 95, at 131 (arguing that voters care more about policy considerations than
federalism per se); McGinnis & Somin, supra note 95, at 103–04 (arguing voter ignorance as to federalism
concerns).
247 See Mikos, supra note 95, at 1673–74, 1699–1703 (surveying empirical studies documenting some
measurable voter interest in federalism).
248 Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 38, at 299–300.
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amounts.249 Moreover, Super PACs have no systemic incentives to advocate
federalism-reinforcing policies—more likely, they will disregard structural
issues in favor of substantive policy preferences; use federalism rhetoric only
strategically where it advances those underlying preferences; and, often, favor
federal action contrary to state interests.250 Citizens United and its progeny
thus likely shift federal officials’ incentives more decisively away from the
interests of ordinary constituents and, therefore, on Wechsler’s view, away
from the institutional interests of states.251
Aside from this primary problem, other post–Citizens United dynamics are
best explored in the context of Wechsler’s theory. First, the perception of
corruption may erode remaining incentives for ordinary constituents to attempt
to influence their federal representatives.252 Citizens United and Super PACs
have increased public concern about the corrupting influence of money in
politics. The Court distinguishes quid pro quo exchanges from other forms of
“ingratiation” or “access” that, on its view, are not sufficiently corrupting to
justify campaign finance restrictions.253 But the public apparently does not
make such a distinction—a significant majority view any service or favorable
treatment for campaign supporters as corrupt and believe that large donors seek
such rewards for their financial support.254 Second, significant outside-group
support may replace the electoral support that federal candidates would
otherwise seek from state government and party officials—endorsements,

249 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (noting that “[c]orporate wealth
can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can
when it assumes the guise of political contributions”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010). See generally Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 126–27 (noting that the problem is not “what happens in
the electoral arena but what incentives are offered to elected officials while in office”).
250 See infra notes 270–89 and accompanying text.
251 See OLSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 139, at 141–48 (describing capture of legislators by
interest groups); Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 125–28 (arguing that capture occurs but that some legal
conceptions of corruption do not encompass capture’s predictable effects).
252 See Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political Campaigns and Modern Vote Dilution, 23 LAW & INEQ.
239, 239–40, 248–51 (2005) (discussing how politicians are increasingly reliant on the contributions of
wealthy donors to support their campaigns, keeping influence increasingly in the hands of a smaller number of
individuals); Briffault, supra note 214, at 954–55 (noting that large donations to outside groups makes it look
like a few wealthy donors “play an enormous role in the electoral process, a role that mocks . . . political
equality”); Overton, supra note 20, at 1277–82.
253 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
254 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 2 (discussing the historic public fear of corporate
influence and recent public perception—about seventy percent of Americans now think officials favor Super
PAC megadonors); Kennedy, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that nine of ten respondents viewed access and
influence as corrupting, and that more than seven of ten respondents believed corporations seek access in
exchange for financial support).
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access to local information, fundraising and voter mobilization operations,
etc.—and thereby close another channel for state interests to reach the agendas
of federal officials.255 Worse, if those state officials’ support becomes another
resource under the control of Super PACs, perhaps in exchange for Super PAC
support for the state officials’ own political ambitions, federal candidates may
get the benefit of localized support without the accompanying pressure to
prioritize state interests.256
As interest groups become more important to candidates’ electoral success,
candidates and officials will increasingly prioritize interest-group demands
over others. This is sometimes called “clientelism.”257 Outside groups’ new
freedom to spend without limit to support candidates’ campaigns makes easier
and more likely the formation of patron–client relationships between
candidates and outside interests that can provide significant campaign
resources.258 Systematic dynamics—including the nationalization of politics,
the increasing cost of successful campaigns, and others—already foster interest
groups’ influence over policymakers.259 But we still might profitably focus on
reducing the worst instances—the “boulevards” and “express lanes” of private
influence.260 Regulation should attempt to prevent the formation of entrenched,
long-term relationships in which officeholders “offer private gain from public
action to distinct, tightly organized constituencies, which in turn may be
mobilized to keep compliant public officials in office.”261
Among other things, the rise of Super PAC-funded elections promises to
increase the influence of outside spending groups not connected to candidates’
geographic constituencies and narrow candidates’ agendas by narrowing their
255 See infra notes 341–63 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Associated Press, Clinton Leads Pack with 10
Endorsements from Governors, ARKANSASONLINE (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/
2008/jan/23/clinton-leads-pack-10-endorsements-governors/?print (noting that gubernatorial “endorsement[s]
[are] campaign gold since governors have . . . their own grass-roots organizing and fundraising networks to
share”); Andrea Kelly, Candidate Endorsements Pile Up, but Do They Matter?, ARIZ. PUB. MEDIA (Oct. 4,
2012),
https://www.azpm.org/p/top-news/2012/10/4/16588-candidate-endorsements-pile-up-but-do-theymatter/ (reporting expert opinions that endorsements often come with access to campaign resources).
256 See infra notes 366–69 and accompanying text (discussing the decreasing relevance of state officials’
and party leaders’ influence in federal elections vis-à-vis Super PACs).
257 See Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 127.
258 See id. at 127–28.
259 Baker & Young, supra note 21, at 112–17 (describing the nationalization of politics); Issacharoff,
supra note 16, at 127–29 (describing how increased election costs incentivize candidates to rely on outsideinterest-group funding sources, which in turn increases the scope of the federal government when federal
officials reward outside groups via federal policy changes).
260 Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 129.
261 Id. at 126.
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donor bases. Both phenomena increase the risk of clientelism. Super PACs
enhance the influence of megadonors who can single-handedly fund
campaigns.262 Such donors had been limited to capped PAC, party, or
candidate contributions, or bankrolling their own ads or organizations;263 Super
PACs lower these transaction costs—and increase incentives to give—by
providing a ready-made mechanism for large donors to pool funds and attract
political experts to ensure those funds are spent to the greatest effect.264 Super
PAC support thus may narrow a candidate’s agenda to that of a single
individual, small group, or industry—and the risk of clientelism is greatest
precisely “when there are only a few large donors, not when there are many
donors who may be substantial but not critical.”265 Increased outside spending
also undermines geographic constituencies by increasing candidates’
incentives to seek campaign support outside their states or districts.266 These
risks are most pronounced in congressional and state elections, where
candidates and parties spend less per race such that outside groups can have a
significant impact with relatively small sums.267 Several 2012 congressional
races became magnets for outside spending: Virginia’s U.S. Senate race
involved roughly $51 million in outside spending—$19 million more than all
candidates’ primary and general election spending combined.268 Outside group

262 See Bowie & Lioz, supra note 3; Nicholas Confessore, Campaign Aid Is Now Surging into 8 Figures,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A1 (reporting that a single donor spending $20 million “almost single-handedly
bankrolled” a Super PAC that was primarily for Newt Gringrich’s presidential run in 2012); supra notes 3–4
and accompanying text (reporting large-donor statistics).
263 See supra Part II.A (describing contribution limitations).
264 Cf. Kang, supra note 10, at 12–13 (noting the analogous transaction cost advantage of the corporate
form for shareholders); Overton, supra note 20, at 1290–93 (describing the relative costs of fundraising).
265 Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 137–38.
266 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Jess Bidgood, Little to Show for Cash Flood by Big Donors, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A1 (reporting a Texas megadonor gave $21 million to Super PAC activities in Florida
and Virginia senate races); Phil Hirschkorn & Nancy Cordes, A Record Amount of Money Spent on Wisconsin
Recall, CBS NEWS (June 6, 2012, 9:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57448678-503544/arecord-amount-of-money-spent-on-wisconsin-recall/ (reporting outside groups spent roughly $33 million in the
2012 Wisconsin statewide election); Andy Kroll, The Super-PAC Steamroller: Coming to a Town Near You!,
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 25, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/04/super-pac-statelocal-james-bopp (detailing state-based Super PAC spending on congressional races in other states).
267 See Price of Admission, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/stats.php?cycle=
2010&display=A&type=W (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (reporting the average hard-money cost of successful
2010 House or Senate campaigns as $1.47 million and $8.9 million, respectively); see also Kroll, supra note
266 (describing Super PACs moving into state politics).
268 See Michelle Martinelli, Massachusetts, Virginia Senate Among 2012’s Most Expensive Races,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov. 6, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/massachusettsvirginia-senate-among.html.
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involvement on one side of a congressional race has forced the other candidate
to seek outside help to remain competitive.269
Even ignoring distortion of Wechsler’s mechanism, there are reasons to
think that Super PAC politics will intensify officials’ incentives to pursue
policies inconsistent with state interests at the urging of private interests.
Empirically, a majority of political influence organizations represent business
interests.270 The factors creating corporations’ comparative advantage in rentseeking—wealth, established institutional structures and discipline, and longterm relationships with federal officials—likely confer similar advantages on
megadonors funding Super PACs and nonprofits.271 Such interests tend to
favor deregulation and other free market policies that often conflict with states’
institutional interests.272 Take, for example, federal preemption of state law.
Industries have the straightforward financial incentive to seek federal
preemption where they face multiple regulatory regimes or otherwise high
transaction costs.273 Cost-reducing centralization and deregulation are most
efficiently accomplished by preemptive federal legislation—a single initiative
in Congress can accomplish what would otherwise require action by each
statehouse, states have little recourse against federal preemption, and industries
269

See Confessore, supra note 18; Posner, supra note 6.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 147–53 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 88–97 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that business interests dominate the lobbying
community); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 65–70 (1986) (concluding that seventy percent of interest groups active in federal policymaking
were business oriented).
271 Cf. Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1109, 1113 (2002) (arguing that corporations can outspend state
governments and state lobbies in national politics).
272 See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL
JURIES 57 (2008) (observing that “[b]usiness interests generally prefer limited government” because “[t]hey
would rather go about their business without worrying about ‘intrusive’ governmental regulations and
‘abusive’ lawsuits”). Interest groups that operate at the federal level will tend to favor federal action—
including for deregulation, which can be most efficiently accomplished through centralized action—and thus
to resist decentralizing power to the states. See generally JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS (1977) (observing that interest groups generally push for
centralized solutions even to localized problems); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER (1992) (describing the steady increase of federal political
power as a result of congressional preemption of state regulatory authority).
273 See, e.g., MCGARITY, supra note 272, at 56–59, 111–45 (discussing several industry efforts to lobby
for federal legislation allowing weaker federal regulatory regimes to preempt state common law remedies);
Baker & Young, supra note 21, at 109–10 (discussing federal aggrandizement of power vis-à-vis state
regulatory authority, often at the prompting of interest groups at the federal level); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
19–20 (2007); Young, supra note 23, at 76–77.
270
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are less likely to encounter opposition from influential public or state interest
groups.274 Thus, powerful industries—pharmaceutical, auto, tobacco, etc.—
have sought deregulatory federal legislation and broad judicial interpretations
of federal preemption in their sectors.275 Importantly, federalism scholars agree
that federal preemption of state law and regulatory authority is a significant
threat; wiping out entire categories of state authority hampers states’ capacity
to supply the regulatory deliverables that sustain citizen loyalty, which in turn
endangers states’ influence in the larger political system.276
Aside from the financial motives, some Super PAC donors appear
ideologically motivated to either disregard or oppose state interests. Roughly
seventy percent of Super PAC spending supports Republicans; an account of
the ideological commitments of those groups might give us a rough picture of
what the majority of megadonors seek.277 With the usual caveats for assessing
multimember institutions’ common goals, it seems fair to say that one
important commitment of many of the wealthiest and most active Super PACs
is to decrease government activity generally, with a rhetorical focus on the
federal government.278 There is not, however, a corresponding commitment to
increasing state government power—instead, the main common interest seems
to be, in general, deregulating certain economic sectors.279
Of course, there will be some interest convergence: Private interests might
favor devolving authority to states (perhaps as a second-best alternative to
deregulation) or want to block federal action that states also oppose.280 There
274 See OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 139, at 24 (arguing that generalized interests rarely mobilize
political-pressure groups because “socially heterogeneous groups . . . are less likely to agree on the exact
nature of whatever collective good is at issue or on how much of it is worth buying”).
275 See MCGARITY, supra note 272, at 111–51 (detailing industry lobbying for weaker federal regulatory
regimes to preempt state common law remedies); Hills, supra note 273, at 19–20 (discussing the political
incentives surrounding preemption in environmental, pension, and securities regulation).
276 See, e.g., Young, supra note 23, at 140–45.
277 See Fundraising and Spending by Political Leaning, 2011–12, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://reporting.
sunlightfoundation.com/outside-spending/by-affiliation/ (last updated Apr. 11, 2013).
278 For example, Americans for Tax Reform’s Grover Norquist famously pledged to shrink the federal
government enough to “drown it in a bathtub.” Michael Scherer, Grover Norquist: The Soul of the New
Machine, MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2004, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/01/grover-norquist-soulnew-machine.
279 See Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 349–55
(2010) (citing the Reagan Administration as an example of the trend that presidents have worked to deregulate
on behalf of economic interests rather than a commitment to federalism); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2315–16 (2001) (arguing that Republican administrations use
federalism rhetoric to advance a generally deregulatory agenda).
280 See, e.g., Hills, supra note 273, at 38 (arguing that groups like state bar associations may prefer statelevel regulatory variation to protect markets). This is sometimes called the “bootleggers and Baptists”
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might also be instances in which Super PACs or other business-backed outside
groups advocate states’ interests out of concern for federalism as such.281 But
most often, federalism rhetoric is insincere, providing political cover rather
than substantive aims282: “Few with influence in the political process care
about promoting state power as an end in itself”283 and “the willingness of
lawmakers and interest groups to manipulate federalism in order to secure
preferred substantive policies is the rule,” a rule that “dates back to the
Framers.”284 Industry groups seem to invoke federalism frequently because the
allocation of government power often overlaps issues of government power
vis-à-vis private actors;285 but such pro-federalism rhetoric most often masks a
deregulatory agenda.286 Industry-group talk about preserving states’ rights may
also cloak a preference for retaining weaker state regimes rather than face new
federal regulation.287 Because interest groups have incentives to hide their
motives, it is difficult here to separate the genuine from the strategic. Proregulation groups also use federalism arguments instrumentally as a neutralsounding way to pursue restrictions on industry.288 However, most groups that
oppose industry are no friends to federalism—perhaps because states have
phenomenon. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 577 (2001); Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists—The Education of a
Regulatory Economist, REGULATION, May/June 1983, at 12, 13–14.
281 The early Tea Party may have been an example. See generally Zietlow, supra note 95, at 510 (“The
long-term goal of the Tea Party movement is to shrink the size and power of the federal government and thus
alter our system of federalism.”).
282 See Devins, supra note 95, at 134 (arguing that officials have long used federalism arguments
strategically to advance other substantive policy preferences); Gilman, supra note 279, at 341–42 (highlighting
presidents’ strategic uses of federalism rhetoric); Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of
Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1059–60 (1997) (arguing that federalism rhetoric is deployed
strategically by holders of diverse political views). Importantly, there is reason to think that federalism
arguments are frequently insincere and strategic when deployed in and by courts as well. See Cross, supra note
82, at 1306–13.
283 Hills, supra note 273, at 36.
284 Devins, supra note 95, at 134.
285 See MCGARITY, supra note 272, at 57.
286 See, e.g., id.; Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”:
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 113–14 (1996) (arguing that “Reagan[’s] ‘new
federalist’ rhetoric also disguised a far more complicated agenda that had as one of its primary goals radical
deregulation”); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 598 & n.8 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Court’s renewed commitment to federalism
camouflages a deregulatory agenda).
287 See MCGARITY, supra note 272, at 57; Hills, supra note 273, at 31 (maintaining that it would be
“inconceivable that environmentalists . . . would sponsor legislation eliminating federal preemption of state
environmental standards if they believed that the practical result would be more lenient state environmental
standards overall”).
288 See Devins, supra note 21, at 134–35; Hills, supra note 273, at 36 (noting some “interests disfavoring
preemption do not favor diversity for its own sake”).
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historically served as the final holdouts of antiprogressive policies on race,
labor, health care, immigration, and so forth.289
To summarize, the wealthy interests that became exponentially more
powerful after Citizens United are most likely to ignore state interests, feign
concern for federalism to advance unrelated substantive goals, or seek
deregulatory federal action that directly constricts state autonomy. Their new,
unlimited capacity to support federal candidates suggests that their preferences
will often trump those of ordinary constituents or states qua states for officials
interested in reelection.290 Wechsler’s representational safeguard would be
decimated.
A related concern is that clientelism incentivizes expanding and adding
complexity to federal programs so that officials can bury their service to
interest-group backers beyond public scrutiny.291 And, of course, federalism
theorists have long argued that all federal expansion diminishes state autonomy
somewhat by diminishing the space in which states may act without worry
about conflicting federal enactments.292
However, it is also possible that the current high visibility of Super PACs
in the ongoing public debate about the effects of Citizens United may have
sparked voter backlash that partially explains the failures of conservativeleaning Super PACs in 2012.293 Voters may regard Super PAC funding as a

289 See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the
War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1277–78, 1302–03 (2004) (noting this, but also that states recently
have been more progressive on issues like marriage equality).
290 Public choice theory does not involve a causal claim that officials are actually single-minded
reelection seekers—the better descriptive account is that officials “pursue a variety of ends simultaneously,
trading goals off against one another and giving no goal overriding priority.” Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian
Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1287–88 (2001); see Edward L.
Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 31–35 (1991). My claim is just that growing outside-group influence will tend to increase the
priority of those groups’ demands for officials interested in retaining office—sometimes at the expense of
constituents who can provide relatively little support. See generally Pursley, supra note 64, at 534–63
(canvassing public choice theory and critiques).
291 See OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 139, 67–74; Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 127–30; Jonathan S.
Krasno & Frank J. Sorauf, Evaluating the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 121, 123–24 (2003).
292 See, e.g., Young, supra note 56, at 1792–93.
293 See Editorial, A Landslide Loss for Big Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at SR12; supra note 12
and accompanying text.
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proxy for candidates’ willingness to pander to special interests.294 That may
decrease outside-group influence or increase candidates’ focus on actual
constituents, but it also may heighten incentives for officials to add legislative
complexity to better hide their service to outside backers—either way, it will
take several cycles to know whether these are real and durable phenomena.
Regardless, as national outside groups grow, so grows the risk that they will
persuade state-protective groups to nationalize their priorities.295 In 2010 and
2012, Super PACs and other outside groups poured millions of dollars into
state races.296 Even if state-interest advocates maintain some measure of
influence over national candidates, Wechsler’s mechanism is nevertheless
undermined if state-level stakeholders stop prioritizing the institutional
interests of state governments.297
B. Political Parties
On Kramer’s account, political parties are an important nonjudicial
safeguard for federalism—they serve as conduits through which federal and
state officials form durable relationships of interdependence that benefit states
in the federal policymaking process.298 Although the parties had to adapt to a
changing campaign finance environment—particularly BCRA’s soft-money
ban—they grew stronger between Buckley and Citizens United.299 Citizens
United and its progeny, however, pose a multifaceted threat to this party-based
model of political federalism.300 Put generally, Super PACs’ and other outside
groups’ growing influence in federal elections positions them to compete with
the major political parties for influence over candidates, elected officials, and
294 See Benjamin Hart, Super PAC Backlash: Washington Post/ABC News Poll Says 69% of Voters Want
Groups Outlawed, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/13/
super-pac-backlash-poll_n_1342055.html.
295 See Young, supra note 23, at 84–85.
296 See, e.g., Hirschkorn & Cordes, supra note 266; Kroll, supra note 266.
297 See infra notes 369–71 and accompanying text.
298 See Kramer, supra note 24, at 276–87; supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
299 See Briffault, supra note 135, at 626–27 (discussing party adaptation to changing campaign finance
restrictions and general increasing strength after Buckley); sources cited infra notes 322–23 (highlighting party
adaptation and renewed strength, particularly in hard-money fundraising, despite the BCRA’s ban on soft
money).
300 The connection between campaign finance and parties’ federalism function is rarely examined. See,
e.g., Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 980 (“Of most consequence for the safeguards position, parties have
become increasingly centralized organizations, with national elites playing a critical role in driving both
fundraising and the formulation of party agendas.”); A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism:
On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 793 (1985) (“[There] has been
a palpable decline in the ‘political’ safeguards [of federalism]. Political parties, especially at the state level, no
longer are the force they once were.” (footnote omitted)).
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thus government action. Such groups are sufficiently different from parties that
they will not serve state interests in the same way. Perhaps more important, the
growth of outside spending after Citizens United has already begun to
undermine state party committees.301 And state parties are crucial
communicators of state interests in larger party networks.302 Super PAC
politics threaten to disrupt parties’ pro-federalism functions by diminishing
both federal candidates’ dependence on parties and state officials’ influence
within party networks.
A robust literature characterizes parties as important mediating institutions
in pluralistic polities—among other things, parties mobilize voters, build
coalitions among constituencies with varying priorities, connect candidates
with officeholders and elites, and refine policy ideas through a process of
internal deliberation.303 Cultivating the variety of interests needed to form a
winning coalition forces parties toward moderate policy commitments.304
Strong parties are arguably important for democratic accountability because,
“[i]n order to hold the government accountable, voters need to face clear,
programmatic choices” of the kind that parties, with unifying policy programs
and ideological agendas, are well-situated to provide across various elections
in a multilevel system.305 And parties are undoubtedly significant campaign
finance institutions, providing candidates with substantial campaign resources

301

See infra notes 352–57 and accompanying text (discussing state parties’ increasing weakness).
See Kramer, supra note 24, at 282; Kramer, supra note 90, at 1538 (arguing that while American
parties are increasingly centralized in general, state and local party committees continue to play an important
role in Kramer’s party safeguards model). See generally John E. Chubb, Federalism and the Bias for
Centralization, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 273 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1985) (describing the general trend toward centralization in American government).
303 See generally AUSTIN RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT: ITS ORIGINS
AND PRESENT STATE 155–63 (1954) (noting the then-current decline of American parties but emphasizing the
positive contribution strong parties can make to government functioning); Comm. on Political Parties, Am.
Political Sci. Ass’n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. (SUPPLEMENT) 1,
45 (1950) (emphasizing the value of strong, disciplined parties for effective governance). There are numerous
theoretical accounts of parties, some of which differ on this score. See generally Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E.
Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
775 (2000) (discussing theoretical paradigms of party power and function).
304 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 674–75 (1998); Raymond J. La Raja, Breaking Up the Party: How McConnell
Downsizes Partisan Campaigns, 3 ELECTION L.J. 271, 271–72 (2004); Michael W. McConnell, Moderation
and Coherence in American Democracy, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 375–78 (2011); see also E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 85 (1942) (noting that “[a] large party must be supported by a great
variety of interests . . . held together by compromise and concession”).
305 Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 174, at 599–600, 602, 608 (2000) (noting that incumbents have
significant fundraising advantages).
302
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and, in particular, aiding challengers in overcoming incumbents’ advantages.306
These effects and the discipline strong parties impose on their members make
parties, in principle, “a counterweight to the many special interests that may
chip away at the public good behind legislation.”307
Before FECA, the major parties had lost much of their influence—some
viewed the condition of state parties in particular as dangerous for
federalism.308 Between FECA and Citizens United, however, parties grew
stronger and gained certain competitive advantages over outside groups309:
Parties still can collect larger contributions than can candidates or PACs—
although they are capped, unlike donations to Super PACs.310 Only parties can
make both unlimited independent expenditures and large hard-money
expenditures in coordination with federal candidates’ campaigns.311 Before the
BCRA, parties could use soft money to “hire staff, acquire office space,
develop direct mail capability, run polling and issue research operations,
acquire data processing equipment, and create and improve facilities for mass
media communications”—in short, to develop the infrastructure required to
function as sophisticated electoral players.312 Soft money increased
coordination between national and state party organizations—state parties
could use more soft money than could national committees for activities
306 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 249–50 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (criticizing the existing campaign finance law’s bias toward incumbents), overruled in part by Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 156–57 (2002) (proposing reforms that would counterbalance
incumbents’ existing campaign-finance advantages over challengers); PETER J. WALLISON & JOEL M. GORA,
BETTER PARTIES, BETTER GOVERNMENT: A REALISTIC PROGRAM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 6–9, 89–
103 (2009) (explaining that incumbents have inherent campaign finance advantages over challengers and that,
after certain legal reforms, parties will be well situated to provide significant institutional and financial support
for challengers).
307 Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 174, at 599.
308 See DAVID S. BRODER, THE PARTY’S OVER: THE FAILURE OF POLITICS IN AMERICA, at xvi, xxiii, 251,
263–64 (1971) (describing American political parties in the 1960s as weak and dysfunctional); WILLIAM H.
RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 91 (1964) (emphasizing American parties’ weakness
in the 1950s and early 1960s); sources cited infra note 352 (describing federalism concerns associated with
state-party weakness); see also CORNELIUS P. COTTER ET AL., PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
62 (1984) (noting reinvigoration after FECA).
309 See Briffault, supra note 135, at 624–27.
310 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2012).
311 See id. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (establishing that coordinated expenditures by nonparties are deemed
contributions); id. § 441a(d) (regulating coordinated expenditures); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 213–19
(invalidating the BCRA provision forcing parties to choose independent or coordinate expenditures); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608–14 (1996) (concluding that the FECA provision
regulating coordinated expenditures does not apply to independent expenditures).
312 Briffault, supra note 135, at 629.
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benefiting both state and federal campaigns—and provided state parties with
enormous resources to improve their infrastructures.313 While large soft-money
donors did seek special access and influence,314 expanding party resources,
including soft money, also created stronger, more disciplined parties—and
history suggests that, on balance, “the influence of money on policy is
diminished when candidates and parties have ample access to fundraising.”315
Importantly, soft money had to flow though the parties, giving them control
over most resources that wealthy donors wanted to funnel to candidates and
thus interposing their moderating influence on those donors’ demands.316
The soft-money ban, by contrast, generated competition with the parties as
large donors had to spend their political money, if at all, independently or
through intermediaries like 527s.317 Contrary to some predictions,318 however,
the parties adapted to maintain their resources and influence by dramatically
increasing their hard-money fundraising.319 This also moved parties away from
overreliance on large donors, reducing the extent to which they served as
conduits for special-interest influence.320 But political money flows to the least
regulated channel, and although large donors had incentives to give soft money
to parties rather than outside groups permitted to make only independent
expenditures,321 the BCRA redirected much of that money to nonparty

313

Id. at 626–29.
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150–51.
315 Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 137; accord Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 174, at 599–600.
316 See sources cited supra note 304.
317 See supra notes 212–22 and accompanying text.
318 See, e.g., Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 174, at 601.
319 See RAYMOND J. LA RAJA, SMALL CHANGE: MONEY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM (2008) (describing adaptability); Gary C. Jacobson, A Collective Dilemma Solved: The Distribution of
Party Campaign Resources in the 2006 and 2008 Congressional Elections, 9 ELECTION L.J. 381, 384–85
(2010); Michael J. Malbin, Political Parties Under the Post-McConnell Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 3
ELECTION L.J. 177, 184 (2004) (noting that parties may offset lost soft money with hard money); see also
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 160 n.5 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010)
(reaffirming the BCRA’s soft-money ban after Citizens United); cf. Richard Briffault, Life of the Parties?
Money, Politics, and Campaign Finance Reform, 8 ELECTION L.J. 207, 212 (2009) (reviewing LA RAJA, supra)
(worrying that parties might nevertheless recede).
320 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150–51 (2003) (describing concerns about large soft-money
donors), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra
note 174, at 601. But see John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
591, 615–17 (2005) (noting parties’ new hard-money “bundling” practices might increase special-interest
influence).
321 See Herbert E. Alexander, The Case FOR Soft Money, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, July–Aug. 1986, at
26, 26–28, available at http://cfinst.org/pdf/HEA/227_caseFORsoftmoney.pdf.
314
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entities.322 After Citizens United, Super PACs are the primary beneficiaries of
the soft-money ban, and this deluge of resources increases outside groups’
capacity to support candidates financially and thus compete with parties for
candidate loyalty.323 This dynamic does not necessarily reduce party resources
if their hard-money fundraising remains strong, but it might eventually if the
resource pool is finite. Either effect—increased competition or decreased
resources—may undermine traditional party characteristics with implications
for political federalism.
If resources shift away from parties as well as toward Super PACs, then
parties’ relative influence declines, undermining their capacity to foster
electoral competition and accountability, policy discipline, etc.—all to states’
political disadvantage. Party support for challengers, for example, can negate
some of the advantages of incumbency and thus foster the electoral
competition that reinforces democratic accountability.324 Private interest
groups, by contrast, tend to support incumbents “as an investment in politics,
with some expectation of a return for their donation”—incumbents therefore
need less party money than challengers.325 Decreased support for challengers
likely means more incumbent victories and the corresponding reinforcement of
special interest influence.326 Resource loss also may damage party
cohesiveness—with less electoral support to spread around, the parties’
capacity to shepherd initiatives through the federal policymaking process likely
would be diminished.327 This could undermine the states’ party-based
influence—especially if party discipline is replaced by special-interest
influence favoring agendas indifferent to state interests.328 These effects
exacerbate two federalism problems. First, the odds are good that the
empowered interest groups will press for centralizing or generally deregulatory
322 See Briffault, supra note 214, at 962–65; Richard L. Hasen, Super-Soft Money, SLATE (Oct. 25, 2011,
2:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/10/citizens_united_how_
justice_kennedy_has_paved_the_way_for_the_re.html; see also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 1715–
16 (noting that political money finds the least regulated channel).
323 See Briffault, supra note 319, at 212.
324 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 174, at 607–08.
325 See id. at 609–10.
326 See, e.g., DAN CLAWSON, ALAN NEUSTADTL & DENISE SCOTT, MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND
POLITICAL INFLUENCE (1992); Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797 (1990) (documenting the
impact of campaign finance on legislative action); see also Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some
Empirical Evidence, 48 J. POL. 1052, 1057–60 (1986).
327 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 174, at 607–08.
328 See Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 1011 (arguing that interest-group influence displaces state
influence and tends to favor interstate priorities).
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federal action.329 Second, incumbents may be systematically biased against
state preferences—retaining federal office often will require federal
aggrandizement, and incumbents will have mastered aspects of that process.330
Even if party resources remain constant, outside groups’ growing capacity
to function as alternatives to parties is problematic in itself—if candidates
perceive no disadvantage in switching their loyalties from parties to Super
PACs, then parties, and their federalism benefits, still may be eroded.331 Some
will argue that the 2012 election shows that parties have already adapted to
Super PACs.332 But the Super PAC threat is evolving as well. Super PACs “run
by party regulars [are beginning to] . . . look, smell, and act a lot like political
party organizations.”333 Former party officials working within Super PACs
may act as conduits for some party control over their activities.334 Super PACs’
dependence on megadonors, however, makes it more likely that those donors’
narrower agendas will take priority.335 The 2012 Republican primaries suggest
that Super PACs coordinated, if at all, with donors and candidates—not
parties.336 As Super PAC support for candidates increases, candidates will
increasingly have incentives to prioritize Super PAC agendas over party
objectives.

329 See David Durenberger, View from the Commission, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP., Fall 1984, at 2, 2
(“Lobbies . . . would find it immeasurably more difficult to press their categorical agendas under a truly
decentralized federal system . . . . [and thus would] exert strong opposition to new decentralizing schemes.”);
Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 1011 (noting that politically invested private interests are “predominantly
corporate and free market” oriented).
330 Incumbent federalism hawks also might be entrenched by a rollback of party resources, but there are
few such officials. On the whole this seems net negative.
331 See, e.g., Timothy Conlan, Ann Martino & Robert Dilger, State Parties in the 1980s: Adaptation,
Resurgence and Continuing Constraints, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP., Fall 1984, at 6, 23.
332 See, e.g., David Schleicher, The Party Is Not Over: Of Super PACs, Saddlebags, and the Survival of
Parties Post–Citizens United, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 14, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.
concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/11/the-party-is-not-over-of-superpacs-saddlebags-and-the-survival-ofthe-parties-post-citizens-united.html.
333 Id.; see, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Billionaires Going Rogue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, http://
campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/billionaires-going-rogue/?page wanted=print (describing how
Super PACs create an “independent source of contracts for the community of political professionals”).
334 See sources cited supra notes 231–34.
335 See sources cited supra note 3.
336 See, e.g., Joe Garofoli, Gingrich’s Failed Run Shows Super PACs’ Power, SFGATE (May 3, 2012, 4:00
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/joegarofoli/article/Gingrich-s-failed-run-shows-super-PACs-power-353
0619.php (describing how a Super PAC propped up a primary candidate and weakened the frontrunner with
attack ads); Bill Schneider, Super PACs Are Ruining Republicans, POLITICO (Mar. 5, 2012, 9:29 PM), http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73630.html#ixzz1oJwLkqZj (describing similar Super PAC campaign
tactics).
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Party structure can only affect the federal policy process as long as parties
wield significant political influence. Outside spending entities are rapidly
gaining on parties financially, in part because they can more easily court large
donors; party leaders, by contrast, must adopt moderate positions and exercise
agenda control to unite the many diffuse constituencies needed to elect large
slates of candidates.337 For now, outside groups’ issue profiles can be narrowly
tailored to the preferences of major donors. If outside groups gain the capacity
to provide primary or total financial support for a winning federal campaign,
they could eliminate financial incentives that might otherwise motivate
candidates to stay loyal to parties.338 Of course candidates will, for the
foreseeable future, still need to be affiliated with a major party, if for no other
reason than to carry a party brand with which voters are familiar.339 But
Kramer’s safeguard requires their dependence on and substantial participation
in party networks, and “both national and state parties remain marginal in
relation to the candidates who raise money independently.”340 Candidates
nominally affiliated with, but minimally dependent on, parties seem less likely
to take seriously the suggestions of state-minded party members.
Outside groups are also developing the capacity to provide party-like
services aside from financial support. Parties offer candidates access to peer
networks and established federal officials for information and endorsements,341
state and local volunteers and organizations for voter outreach and campaign
events, successful strategists and pollsters, and public signaling benefits of
337

See sources cited supra note 304.
See Briffault, supra note 319, at 212 (noting the increasing competition between interest groups and
parties for national candidates’ loyalties).
339 The history of third-party and independent candidates’ electoral success in this country is not
encouraging for those considering abandoning the major parties entirely. See Christopher S. Elmendorf &
David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 394–408 (discussing the implications of party brand familiarity for efforts to increase voters’
familiarity with issues). See generally Shigeo Hirano & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Decline of Third-Party
Voting in the United States, 69 J. POL. 1 (2007) (emphasizing the general historical dominance of major parties
and observing, for example, that no third-party candidate received even ten percent of the vote for House,
Senate, or Governor in any state from 1940–1970).
340 Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 995; see also id. at 979–80.
341 Super PACs increasingly offer large donors the sort of special access benefits—for example, by
making candidates and officials available at fundraisers—that once were the exclusive province of parties or
campaigns. See, e.g., Sheelah Kolhatkar, Inside Karl Rove’s Billionaire Fundraiser, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-31/exclusive-inside-karlroves-billionaire-fundraiser; Jeff Mason, In Shift, Obama Campaign to Support Super PAC Fundraiser,
REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE81617U20120207; Kenneth P.
Vogel, Rick Santorum Speaks at Super PAC Fundraiser, POLITICO (Feb. 24, 2012, 3:46 PM), http://dyn.
politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=955E14F6-3133-47B3-9963-5E2D4E7F01B4.
338
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party brands.342 American Crossroads, for example, provided some groundgame support for its candidates in 2012; outside groups are also using their
financial advantage to recruit top political professionals.343 Super PACs and
nonprofits are expanding their slates: American Crossroads and Crossroads
GPS spent on thirty-one federal races in 2012, and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce spent on at least thirty-nine races, to cite just two examples.344
Large majorities of Republican congressional candidates have endorsed
Americans for Tax Reform’s antitax pledge; which in turn shaped recent fiscal
debates in Congress.345 As their candidate slates expand, they will offer greater
networking opportunities and eventually, with their narrower agendas and
smaller constituencies, programmatic discipline to help candidates claim
reelection-ensuring policy victories at discounted transaction costs.346 These
dynamics are interdependent: As outside groups become more party-like in the
services they provide, they will attract more candidates.

342 See Jonathan Woon & Jeremy C. Pope, Made in Congress? Testing the Electoral Implications of Party
Ideological Brand Names, 70 J. POL. 823, 825 (2008) (describing party brands’ functioning as voter-accessible
proxies for candidates’ policy positions); James Hohmann, RNC Steps Up Voter Outreach, POLITICO (Sept. 7,
2012, 7:59 PM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=88F63BC7-BF49-413E-A8EE-744C7E38B75E
(highlighting Republican party’s ground-game services for 2012 Romney presidential campaign); Party
Services, ARIZ. DEMOCRATIC PARTY, http://azdem.org/about/party_services/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014)
(offering messaging, strategic outreach and fundraising services). See generally Alan S. Gerber & Donald P.
Green, The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653 (2000) (demonstrating that ground game increases turnout).
343 See Scott Conroy, Northern Virginia Edge Could Be Pivotal for Obama, REAL CLEAR POL. (June 13,
2012),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/06/13/northern_virginia_edge_could_be_pivotal_for_
obama_114458-full.html (reporting that the Romney campaign “largely outsourced its Virginia ground
operation.”); sources cited supra notes 231–34.
344 See Follow the Unlimited Money: American Crossroads, 2012 Cycle, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://
reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/outside-spending/committee/american-crossroads/C00487363 (last updated
April 11, 2013); Follow the Unlimited Money: Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies, 2012 Cycle,
SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/outside-spending-2012/committee/crossroadsgrassroots-policy-strategies/C90011719 (last updated April 11, 2013); Follow the Unlimited Money: U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, 2012 Cycle, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/outsidespending/committee/us-chamber-of-commerce/C90013145 (last updated April 11, 2013).
345 Americans for Tax Reform (ATR), a 501(c)(4) nonprofit, made over $15 million in independent
expenditures in 2012. See About Americans for Tax Reform, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM, http://www.atr.org/about
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014); Follow the Unlimited Money: Americans for Tax Reform, 2012 Cycle, SUNLIGHT
FOUND., http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/outside-spending-2012/committee/americans-for-tax-reform/
C90011289 (last updated April 11, 2013); see also Lee Fang, The Truth About Grover Norquist, NATION INST.
(Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.nationinstitute.org/featuredwork/fellows/3099 (“Norquist’s influence actually
derives from his alliances with powerful donors.”); Jeremy W. Peters, For Tax Pledge and Its Author, a Test of
Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/us/politics/grover-norquist-author-ofantitax-pledge-faces-big-test.html?_r=1&&pagewanted=print (reporting that 250 signing members of
Congress pledged never to vote for a tax increase).
346 See infra notes 344–45 and accompanying text.
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State party organizations were considered central to federalism even before
Kramer wrote, “Strong and vigorous state parties historically have provided an
important channel of intergovernmental communication and state influence in
Washington.”347 Even as state parties respond to the nationalization of voters’
interests by increasing their focus on national matters348 and correspondingly
deprioritizing state and local issues, they remain central to the party safeguard
mechanism in two significant senses. First, they provide forums for those
invested in state issues to form relationships and collaborate, and during
federal elections, state parties connect these state-focused networks to the
national parties’ parallel networks of candidates, operatives, and officials.349
Second, state parties still provide to federal candidates staff and volunteers
with local expertise for voter outreach and mobilization, and deliver state and
local officials to endorse, raise money, provide information about voters’
localized concerns, and otherwise increase federal candidates’ appeal to the
subnational electorates they must turn out to win.350 These “blood and muscle”
resources—which national campaigns would have difficulty replicating
without state parties’ established organizations—are important regardless of
voters’ substantive concerns and contribute to the dependence of federal party
operators on state officials that undergirds Kramer’s safeguard.351
State parties, with their national counterparts, declined before FECA; but
while FECA treated them as equivalent to PACs, state parties nevertheless
grew stronger and increased their coordination with national parties in its
wake.352 The soft-money ban dealt a blow to this burgeoning coordination and
347

Conlan et al., supra note 331, at 6.
See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 339.
349 See Kramer, supra note 24, at 278–83.
350 See Conlan et al., supra note 331, at 6 (suggesting state parties maintain “significant organizational
presence in their states”); La Raja, supra note 304, at 273 (noting parties’ “coordinated get-out-the-vote
programs with state affiliates”); Sarah M. Morehouse & Malcolm E. Jewell, State Parties Adjust to BCRA,
Paper Presentation at the University of Akron Bliss Institute of Applied Politics Conference: State of the
Parties: 2004 and Beyond 2–3 (Oct. 5–7, 2005), http://www.uakron.edu/bliss/docs/state-of-the-partiesdocuments/Morehouse.Jewell.pdf.
351 Contrary to one critique, see Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 1011–14, Kramer’s account does not
require that state officials exercise control over national-party operations. It requires networks that transmit
state interests and create incentives for federal officials to listen even if the party generally focuses on national
issues. See Kramer, supra note 24, at 278–83.
352 See TODD DONOVAN, CHRISTOPHER Z. MOONEY & DANIEL A. SMITH, STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS:
INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM 170–71 (2d ed. 2011); Paul R. Abramson et al., Challenges to the American TwoParty System: Evidence from the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 Presidential Elections, 53 POL. RES. Q. 495
(2000); Briffault, supra note 135, at 629; Cynthia C. Colella, Intergovernmental Aspects of FECA: State
Parties and Campaign Finance, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP., Fall 1984, at 14 (noting that state and local
committees are subject to FECA treatment); Conlan et al., supra note 331, at 6–8; Kramer, supra note 24
348
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diminished state parties’ autonomous fundraising capacity.353 To maintain
freedom to focus on subnational issues, state parties need to generate resources
on their own, just as they need strong organizations providing services for
federal candidates to generate clout and leverage in party networks.354 But the
BCRA functionally barred state parties from using soft money in ways useful
to national parties.355 This restriction reduced both coordination and
fundraising—it made hard money more precious, diminishing national-party
incentives to fund state-party-building activities; and it increased regulatory
barriers to state-party contributions to federal campaigns.356 The
nationalization of politics and voter interests has also hampered state-party
fundraising.357 State-party fundraising recovered somewhat in the years after
the BCRA and, contrary to some claims, issue nationalization has not turned
state parties into mere arms of their national counterparts.358
Nevertheless, national parties still have incentives to coordinate with state
parties. Some state laws allow state parties to tap funds not open to national
parties for use in state voter outreach and mobilization.359 Building an effective
nationwide organization “requires either an immense amount of money or the
support from many state leaders who can assist by offering the aid of their
existing party organizations.”360 Banning soft money created some incentives
for national parties coping with their own resource shortfalls to seek state-party
organizational assistance, and at the same time placed local organizations more
squarely under state-party control.361

(writing at the height of the soft-money era); Krasno & Sorauf, supra note 291, at 138–39 (attributing stateparty revitalization in part to soft money); La Raja, supra note 304, at 272; Sara M. Morehouse, State Parties:
Independent Partners: The Money Relationship, Paper Presentation at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association 3 (Aug. 31–Sept. 3, 2000), http://www.cfinst.org/parties/papers/
morehouse_stateparties.pdf; sources cited supra note 308.
353 See La Raja, supra note 304.
354 See Conlan et al., supra note 331, at 7.
355 See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text. The BCRA exempts from soft-money prohibitions
donations from individuals to state or local party committees, up to $10,000 per year, for party-building
activity without specific federal-candidate identification. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2) (2012).
356 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122–26 (2003) (discussing the transfer of soft money to state
parties), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Briffault, supra note 135, at 629;
La Raja, supra note 304, at 272; Persily, supra note 183.
357 See, e.g., Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 992.
358 Compare id., with Morehouse & Jewell, supra note 350, at 2–3.
359 See, e.g., State Limits on Contributions to Candidates: 2011–2012 Election Cycle, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/Limits_ to_Candidates_2011-2012.pdf (last
updated Sept. 30, 2011) (showing twelve states with no individual contribution limit).
360 Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 994.
361 See id. at 993–94 (describing how the BCRA increased state-party influence).
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State parties—with their blood-and-muscle resources—are best situated to
conduct these important ground-game operations. Building quality
organizations requires familiarity with local players and priorities. This is
particularly important in our system of front-loaded presidential primaries that
“privilege[] candidates who have large campaigns that are organized in many
different states at once”—candidates who succeed do so “in no small part due
to the efforts of state leaders around the country.”362 And in 2012, much stateparty spending was dedicated to organizing, outreach, and turnout activities.363
National parties thus still have incentives to provide deliverables that matter to
state-party officials in exchange for ground-game assistance.
These and all other party mechanisms are directly threatened by the growth
of Super PACs and similar entities. National candidates now have access to
unlimited resources, so they are no longer necessarily dependent on state party
organizations. Super PACs are beginning to replicate state parties’
organizational achievements—indeed, 527 organizations ran some voter
turnout operations as early as 2004.364 The widespread view that the ground
game was critical to President Obama’s victory will motivate Super PACs to
intensify efforts to develop capacity to provide these services.365 Candidates
also may, with unlimited outside funding and the longstanding belief that
television ads are the most effective electioneering tools, opt for spending on
air wars—a Super PAC specialty—rather than ground-game activities. Both
dynamics diminish state-party incentives to invest in organizations, and
eventually might give Super PACs a competitive advantage. State parties,
because of their smaller resource pools, lower visibility, and financial

362

Id. at 993.
See, e.g., Paul Blumenthal, Obama Ground Game: State Parties Flush with Cash in Swing States,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/obama-groundgame-swing-states_n_2009600.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. These and other electoral functions that
preserve state-party significance—e.g., presidential primaries—are increasingly focused on early primary
states and general-election battleground states. See, e.g., Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 992–94 (discussing
national parties’ increasing focus on early primary states). This may create another federalism problem by
skewing party networks in favor of powerful states. Inequality of state influence in national politics may
undermine federalism’s durability. See Baker & Young, supra note 21, at 115–16; Gardner & Abad I Ninet,
supra note 97, at 491. These “swing-state federalism” problems are largely unexplored and I will return to
them in future work.
364 Briffault, supra note 214, at 955.
365 See A Landslide Loss for Big Money, supra note 293 (“Independent groups . . . may begin thinking
about how better to use their money to target voters and build grass-roots efforts . . . .”); Conroy, supra note
343 (reporting outsourcing turnout in Virginia in 2012); Rebecca Sinderbrand, Analysis: Obama Won with a
Better Ground Game, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/analysis-why-obama-won/index.html
(last updated Nov. 7, 2012, 7:00 AM).
363
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vulnerability after the BCRA, have worried about competition from nonparty
groups since the advent of PACs.366 Super PACs, with their unlimited
fundraising potential, have even greater capacity to provide donors and
candidates with attractive alternatives to state parties.367 If they develop the
capacity to compete on the services state parties are structured to offer as their
best products, there is no obvious way for state parties to adapt and maintain
their relevance in federal elections. Increased Super PAC competition in
federal elections also motivates national parties to further centralize because, to
compete, national parties will need to retain more of the hard money they
might otherwise send to state parties and to further nationalize and
professionalize their ranks, pushing state operators out of party networks.368
State-party fundraising is down significantly since Citizens United.369
Finally, Super PACs have begun intervening in state and local elections,
where they can get significantly more value for every dollar and readily
outmatch opposing candidates and subnational party organizations.370 Super
PAC competition with state parties in state races—either for candidate clients
or donors—exacerbates the incentive problems that arose from the soft-money
ban. Their status as unregulated alternatives to state parties gives candidates
and donors a reason to shift their allegiance. Resulting decreases in state-party
resources reduce state-party services, driving candidates away and further
discouraging national-party collaboration and resource transfers. State parties
will have to expend more resources on state contests, diminishing their
capacity to participate in federal elections and thus to earn consideration of
state interests within party networks.

366 See, e.g., Conlan et al., supra note 331, at 23; Durenberger, supra note 329, at 31 (emphasizing state
parties’ problems with outside-group competition).
367 See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text (discussing PACs and legal restrictions on PAC
fundraising).
368 See Frymer & Yoon, supra note 21, at 988–89, 997–1000 (noting this effect of PAC and interest-group
competition with parties in the pre-BCRA era).
369 See Neil Reiff, State and Local Party Committees: An Endangered Species?, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, July/Aug. 2012, at 12, 13 (“[T]he average Democratic state party committee raised less than
$500,000 . . . for the entire 2011 calendar year.”). Swing-state parties raise money more successfully in
election years—but much of it is sent by national parties or raised by national candidates. See, e.g.,
Blumenthal, supra note 363.
370 See, e.g., David Nyczepir, The Super PAC Onslaught: Is Your Local Campaign Next?, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, July/Aug. 2012, at 47, 47–49; Nicholas Confessore, Missouri Political Donor Thrives with No
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/us/politics/missouri-political-donorthrives-with-no-limits-giving.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print (describing Super
PAC
intervention in state races); Kroll, supra note 266.
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There are reasons to doubt, however, that Super PACs will become
moderating entities. Candidates and parties increasingly depend on Super
PACs to remain competitive in elections; Super PACs’ capacity to deploy
unlimited resources in support of a candidate makes them more valuable than
other, smaller-scale contributors that may form part of the candidate’s or
party’s coalition.371 Super PACs’ capacity to replace smaller-donor support
that candidates may lose by taking certain policy positions, and Super PACs’
increasing value as political supporters together suggest that candidates and
parties will be increasingly likely to subordinate smaller donors’ preferences to
the preferences of Super PACs and their donors. And, Super PACs are
overwhelmingly dependent on wealthy individual donors372 who may give in
larger amounts to outside groups than they do to candidates or parties because
they want to press an ideological position.373 Super PACs’ financial incentives
to fulfill their ideological commitments suggest that they will remain
polarizing forces. The same incentives should prevent Super PACs that expand
to incorporate state and local ground-game operations and staff from becoming
functional conduits for the transmission of state-government preferences—
large donors’ desires, often for centralization or deregulation, will take priority.
While a Super PAC with an ideological commitment to federalism might
reinforce the political safeguards, no such organization presently exists and,
even if it did, federalism rhetoric is most often insincerely deployed to further
substantive policy objectives that may actually conflict with state interests.374
This creates the worst of both worlds: Strong, broad-based organizations with
sufficiently large delegations of “client officials” to enact controversial
legislation but with sufficiently strong ideological discipline to forestall the
moderation of conventional parties. Reproduction of state-protective
mechanisms within Super PACs therefore seems unlikely—certainly so in the
short term.

371 See Nicholas Confessore, G.O.P. Campaigns Grow More Dependent on “Super PAC” Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/politics/super-pac-role-grows-for-republicancampaigns.html?pagewanted=print; Confessore, supra note 18 (noting that despite objections to Citizens
United and Super PACs, President Obama and Democratic candidates in 2012 resorted to Super PACs “to be
financially competitive”).
372 See Bowie & Lioz, supra note 3 (discussing megadonors).
373 Cf. Briffault, supra note 214, at 964–65 (suggesting that wealthy individual donors to outside political
groups are more likely to be motivated by ideology than corporations).
374 See Devins, supra note 95, at 131–34.
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C. The Intergovernmental Lobby
The intergovernmental lobby is composed of multiple organizations—the
National Governors Association (NGA), National Conference of State
Legislators, National League of Cities, National Association of Attorneys
General and U.S. Conference of Mayors are the most prominent,375 but there
are many others.376 The perceived failure of traditional political safeguards and
federal-government expansion were among the reasons for their formation.377
Beyond their primary function—lobbying federal officials on behalf of state
governments378—these groups facilitate an exchange of ideas among states and
with federal officials, disseminate information on federalism issues, and, like
political parties, link the fates of state and federal officials.379 The NGA often
is a lead group for the others; and while groups’ interests sometimes diverge—
on water issues, for example, which disproportionately affect western states, or
oil and gas policy, which affects primarily petrochemical producing states—
they have reached consensuses when federal action threatened universal state
interests such as avoiding broad preemption or preserving grants-in-aid.380
Most federal action that impacts states prompts intervention by at least some
groups.381 We need not resolve the academic debate over lobbyists’ actual
influence on legislative outcomes—here, assume that intergovernmental lobby
375

See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 119; Peabody & Nugent, supra note 70, at 51 n.184.
See Peabody & Nugent, supra note 70, at 51 n.184 (noting “several hundred”). See generally Judith
Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105 (2008)
(listing many intergovernmental lobbying groups); Heather M. Creek, Fifty Interest Groups: The U.S. States
and the Intergovernmental Lobby, Paper Presentation at 2012 State Politics and Policy Conference (Feb. 17,
2012), http://2012sppconference.blogs.rice.edu/files/2012/02/Fifty-Interest-Groups-SPPC-Creek.pdf (listing
additional intergovernmental lobbying groups).
377 See R. Allen Hays, Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of Issue Priorities, 44 W.
POL. Q. 1081, 1081 (1991) (describing the expansion of federal policymaking into nearly every area, including
those traditionally regulated by states); Peabody & Nugent, supra note 70, at 55 (highlighting process failures).
378 See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 7–10. See generally ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, GOVERNMENTS AS
INTEREST GROUPS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1995) (analyzing the
development of intergovernmental lobbying); DONALD H. HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO
WASHINGTON: GOVERNORS, MAYORS, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING (1974) (discussing the
intergovernmental lobby’s attempt to influence federal policy and the degree to which it has succeeded).
379 See Timothy J. Conlan, Robert L. Dudley & Joel F. Clark, Taking On the World: The International
Activities of American State Legislatures, PUBLIUS, Summer 2004, at 183, 196; Resnik, supra note 376, at
1131; cf. NUGENT, supra note 117, at 117–18.
380 See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 29–36 (categorizing state interests); id. at 129–33 (discussing diverging
interests); id. at 152–53 (highlighting grants).
381 See Peabody & Nugent, supra note 70, at 52–53 (noting that intergovernmental lobby
“involvement . . . is the norm when . . . Congress considers legislation with implications for state
governments”); cf. NUGENT, supra note 29, at 130–31 (describing intergovernmental-lobby monitoring of all
federal activity).
376
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groups can effectively safeguard federalism in some instances.382 And they do
succeed, at least in part, fairly frequently.383
Comparing intergovernmental lobby organizations with private lobbies
helps highlight problems that Super PACs create in this context: One obvious
difference is that Super PACs and their donors spend enormous amounts of
money to support candidates for election while intergovernmental groups do
not participate appreciably in campaign finance. Additionally, Super PACs
have significantly earlier access to officials—when they first become
candidates—and may “lock up” loyalties before intergovernmental groups
have a chance to press their interests, forcing intergovernmental groups into a
weaker, reactive position.
The resource disparity is the most obvious problem. Lobbyists have long,
sometimes infamously,384 used campaign finance for persuasion; successful
“[l]obbyists . . . have become prolific fundraisers and bundlers of campaign
contributions for key legislators and party leaders.”385 Large Super PAC
donors often already have a lobbying presence in Washington.386 Prominent
Super PACs are branching out into lobbying; prominent lobbying groups like
the National Association of Realtors are forming Super PACs to increase their
influence;387 and significant informal connections, like staff crossovers, link

382

See Hasen, supra note 243, at 218 (canvassing debate).
See CAMMISA, supra note 378, at 124–27 (describing successes); NUGENT, supra note 29, at 126–66;
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 70, at 52.
384 See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, James V. Grimaldi & R. Jeffrey Smith, Investigating Abramoff—Special
Report, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/linkset/2005/06/22/LI2005062200936.
html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (compiling stories detailing the infamy of lobbyists).
385 Hasen, supra note 243, at 222; accord BERRY, supra note 272, at 263 (describing “constituency
influence” lobbying strategy); JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF FUNDRAISING’S INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 42–43 (2000) (describing lobbyists’ bundling
activities).
386 Briffault, Super PACs, supra note 8, at 1691–92 (noting that Super PAC donors engaged in lobbying
on a variety of issues); Alexander Bolton, Romney and Obama Super-PAC Backers Also Spent Big Dollars on
Lobbying, HILL (Feb. 25, 2012, 8:24 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/212547-donors-backingromney-and-obama-super-pacs-spent-tens-of-thousands-on-lobbying.
387 See Eliza Newlin Carney, Super PACs Make Move to Lobbying, ROLL CALL (Nov. 30, 2012, 12:32
AM), http://www.rollcall.com/ news/super_pacs_make_move_to_lobbying-219080-1.html?zkPrintable=true;
Dave Levinthal, Super PACs Get New Use—As Lobbying Arms on Hill, POLITICO (Sept. 25, 2012, 5:59 PM),
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=62E43429-D485-4EFE-86FF-89503869D0CD (quoting a public
affairs professional as saying legislators’ “ears are really going to perk up [if you say] . . . the words ‘super
PAC’ . . . . It’s such a big, scary thing—and can give you an extra edge of influence” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
383
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Super PACs to lobbying groups.388 And the deregulation of independent
expenditures means that lobbyists representing major Super PACs, their
donors, or those donors’ industries can offer limitless electoral support to
candidates.389 Limitless private electoral spending in the new regime fosters
strong patron–client relationships.390 Direct campaign contributions by
lobbyists are restricted—for example, they cannot act as conduits for thirdparty contributions.391 The new capacity of Super PACs to spend without limit
on independent electioneering provides a workaround.392 Private lobbies also
enjoy a competitive advantage because of their capacity to operate a “revolving
door” between governmental service and the lucrative private lobbying job
often waiting for cooperative officials when they leave office.393 Officials will
know the identities and interests of their major donors, not least because Super
PAC ads can identify specific candidates and informal connections—former
staffers, shared consultants, etc.—to link Super PACs to campaigns.394 And,
Super PACs employ professional strategists to maximize returns on electoral
spending; thus, the officials they sponsor should be well positioned to serve
their donors and are certain targets for those donors’ lobbyists.395 If it is clear
to officials that a lobbyist represents Super PAC donors or otherwise has
access to Super PAC resources, the lobbyist’s message becomes substantially

388 See, e.g., Michael Beckel, Lobbyists Like Pro-Obama Super PAC, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (July 25,
2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/07/25/10202/lobbyists-pro-obama-super-pac (noting
private lobbyists that gave to a pro-Obama Super PAC); Lee Fang, Corporate Lobbyists Run Almost Every
Pro-Romney Super PAC, NATION (Oct. 10, 2012, 1:38 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/170472/
corporate-lobbyists-run-almost-every-pro-romney-super-pac#.
389 See Levinthal, supra note 387.
390 See Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 119–20.
391 See, e.g., Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735,
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (instituting reporting requirements for “bundling” and banning
lobbyist gifts to officials); Hasen, supra note 243, at 200–06 (canvassing current federal and state lobbying
laws).
392 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
393 See Hasen, supra note 243, at 224.
394 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 8, at 1685–86 (discussing candidate interactions with Super PACs);
Posner, supra note 6 (noting that candidates have incentives to discover who funds supportive Super PACs);
see also supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text (emphasizing cross-staffing between campaigns and
Super PACs as a potential means of coordination).
395 See, e.g., Rick Cohen, The Morphing of Super PAC Lobbying: From Election to Issue, NONPROFIT Q.
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/21490-the-morphing-of-super-paclobbying-from-election-to-issue.html (“[H]alf of the [National Association of] Realtors’ super PAC
contributions went to two members of Congress . . . on the House Financial Services Committee. Guess where
some of the Realtors’ major policy priorities will be debated?”).

PURSLEY GALLEYSPROOFS

844

4/3/2014 2:50 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:781

more persuasive and failure to act on the lobbyist’s request becomes
substantially more threatening.396
Intergovernmental lobby groups cannot generate comparable financial
influence over candidates. They do not invest appreciably in campaign
finance.397 As is characteristic of groups representing diffuse interests, the
intergovernmental lobby’s resources already are thinner than those of lobbyists
for narrower private interests with unlimited financial backing: Their staffs are

396 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbies’ New Power: Cross Us, and Our Cash Will Bury You, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2010, at A1 (“The Supreme Court has handed a new weapon to lobbyists. If you vote wrong, a
lobbyist can now tell any elected official that my company, labor union or interest group will spend unlimited
sums explicitly advertising against your re-election.”); Cohen, supra note 395 (reporting that the National
Association of Realtors poured millions of dollars into the campaigns of supportive members of a House
committee that was central to deciding issues relating to the group’s legislative agenda).
397 A search of Internet-based compilations of campaign finance reports shows no contributions or
expenditures falling within FEC reporting requirements for the National Governors Association, National
Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of Attorneys General, or Noncommercial Stakeholders
Group since 1991. See INFLUENCE EXPLORER, http://influenceexplorer.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2014)
(showing no FEC reporting for any of these entities in results). The National League of Cities gave $4,750 to
then-Senator Barack Obama’s presidential campaign in 2008 and $1,750 to his 2012 campaign; it has also
given small amounts to several democratic candidates for Congress or state office. National League of Cities,
INFLUENCE EXPLORER, http://influenceexplorer.com/organization/national-league-of-cities (use the “Currently
viewing National League of Cities from” drop-down menu to select the appropriate date range; select “2007–
2008,” “2009–2010,” and “2011–2012,” respectively) (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). The U.S. Conference of
Mayors made similar de minimis contributions to one or a few candidates some years. See U.S. Conference of
Mayors, INFLUENCE EXPLORER, http://influenceexplorer.com/organization/us-conference-of-mayors (use the
“Currently viewing US Conference of Mayors from” drop-down menu to select the appropriate date range;
select “2007–2008” and “2011–2012,” respectively) (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (revealing that U.S. Conference
of Mayors made $250 contributions to Barack Obama in both 2008 and 2012 and a $5000 contribution to
William Tong’s Senate campaign in 2012). The National Association of Counties has engaged primarily in
similar de minimis contributions scattered through various election cycles, but gave roughly $74,000 in the
2000 election cycle—a large amount compared to other intergovernmental lobby contributions—and
distributed about sixty percent to Republican and forty percent to Democratic committees. See National
Association of Counties, INFLUENCE EXPLORER, http://influenceexplorer.com/organization/national-assn-ofcounties/4c05fbcec4f34f0781058ee6e4ad550c?cycle=2000 (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). These appear to have
been soft-money committees. Nor does Nugent list campaign spending as a function of the primary groups.
See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 122–38. Intergovernmental lobby groups that did make contributions frequently
selected candidates without regard to party affiliation, as most contributed to both Republican and Democratic
candidates. One exception not important here is that certain partisan organizations composed of state
officials—most prominently the Republican and Democratic Governors’ Associations—participate in
financing state election activity. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The $500 Million Question: Are the Democratic
and Republican Governors Associations Really State PACs Under Buckley’s Major Purpose Test?, 15 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 489 (2012) (“Between October 4, 2002 and December 31, 2010 . . . the
[Democratic and Republican] Governors Associations participated in gubernatorial elections in forty-eight of
the fifty states, and spent nearly half a billion dollars.” (footnote omitted)). Although they are occasionally
lumped in with the intergovernmental lobby, these groups are more like party committees susceptible to
displacement by Super PACs. See supra Part III.B.
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small and overloaded with monitoring, research, and other duties.398
Intergovernmental lobby group officials can offer other forms of electoral
support, including endorsements and access to local organizations—indeed,
federal candidates often are former state officials likely familiar with these
groups.399 While this may substitute for some monetary support—indeed may
be necessary regardless of a candidate’s financial position—the expense of
campaigns, and especially television ads, along with Super PACs’ increasing
capacity to provide ground-level organizational support suggests that
candidates will value Super PAC support more than that of the
intergovernmental groups.400 Of course, money is not lobbyists’ only path to
influence: Direct cash-for-votes exchanges are rare;401 instead, lobbyists use
campaign money to “reinforce established connections” and cement “longterm relationships and friendships” that will serve clients’ interests over
time.402 Connections may be more important to persuasion than other lobbying
tools (e.g., providing support for officials’ existing positions);403 and
intergovernmental organizations, composed of well-connected state officials,
have an advantage in this regard.404 But private interests’ new freedom to
commit limitless resources to forming early, strong patron–client relationships
seems destined to diminish this advantage and increase the cost of influence
for opposition groups.
This is problematic if Super PACs’ interests conflict with those of
intergovernmental lobby groups. Interest convergence is possible, but these
groups’ core objectives are incompatible in many cases. Private interests and
state governments will clash over some federal policies—for example, as I

398 See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND
WHY 11–12 (2009); NUGENT, supra note 29, at 128–42; Hasen, supra note 243, at 227–28. See generally
OLSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 139.
399 See supra notes 341–46 and accompanying text.
400 See generally DARRELL M. WEST, AIR WARS: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS,
1952–2000 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the importance and expense of advertising in campaigns).
401 See Hasen, supra note 243, at 217–18.
402 ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF LOBBYING AND THE CORROSION OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 297 (2009) (quoting lobbyist Gerry Cassidy) (internal quotation mark omitted); see
TASK FORCE ON FED. LOBBYING LAWS, ABA, LOBBYING LAW IN THE SPOTLIGHT: CHALLENGES AND
PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS 20 (2011), available at http://www.american.edu/spa/ccps/upload/lobbying_task_
force_report _010311.pdf (describing lobbyists and officials in a “self-reinforcing cycle of mutual financial
dependency”); Hasen, supra note 243, at 219–21 (stating that lobbyists create a “culture of reciprocity”).
403 See Hasen, supra note 243, at 224 (arguing that, in lobbying, “who you know is more important than
what you know”).
404 Cf. NUGENT, supra note 29, at 144–45 (noting that intergovernmental-lobby groups’ stature comes in
part from members who are elected state officials).
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mentioned, private-interest requests for centralization or deregulation may
conflict with states’ interest in continuing regulatory power even where the
states want direct federal regulation of a subject replaced by collaborative
regimes or increased state regulatory discretion.405 Intergovernmental-lobby
influence declined in the 1980s in part because “the Reagan Administration
tried to radically reorient the federal domestic role”406 by shrinking it—an
objective shared by many contemporary Super PAC megadonors.407
Administration officials viewed intergovernmental groups as “self-serving
supplicants at the public trough, driving up federal costs in order to enhance
their own influence” and thus cut their funding and access as part of a general
strategy to roll back federal activity.408 The relevant interests have not changed
much; interests pushing centralizing or deregulatory agendas may be hostile to
intergovernmental lobbying groups today.
While it is rarely zero-sum, interest groups may displace one another.
Officials do not have unlimited capacity to respond to requests—“given finite
quantities of elected officials’ and staff’s time, there is a declining marginal
utility of lobbying.”409 There is also a finite number of proposals on which a
legislator, say, will vote and only two possible actions—“yes” or “no.” Where
opposing interest groups have invested in access to the legislator, and she
cannot serve them all through compromise, she must choose which interests to
satisfy.410 Public choice theory suggests that she will favor the group that can
do more to affect her chances of reelection;411 the lobbying literature suggests
that the most successful lobbyists are those who channel the best information
and most significant campaign resources to officials.412 When interest groups
clash, then, Super PACs and their lobbyists are on the right side of an
405 See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 36–40 (noting that states share “[l]egalistic” interests in “be[ing]
recognized as the authoritative decisionmakers . . . without the threat” of preemption); supra Part III.A.
406 Hays, supra note 377, at 1081.
407 See, e.g., Fredreka Schouten, Gregory Korte & Christopher Schnaars, 25% of Super PAC Money
Coming from Just 5 Rich Donors, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ news/politics/story/2012-0221/super-pac-donors/53196658/1 (last updated Feb. 22, 2012, 10:15 AM) (noting that major donors “put their
resources behind their vision of the appropriate relationship between the government and the private sector,”
namely “low taxes, small government, and personal responsibility” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
408 Hays, supra note 377, at 1081–82.
409 Hasen, supra note 243, at 229 (arguing that lobbying wastes resources).
410 Cf. id. (noting the “finite quantities of elected officials’ and staff’s time” as a limit on the potential
efficacy of lobbying).
411 See generally sources cited supra notes 139, 291.
412 See GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 10–15 (2001); Hasen,
supra note 243, at 216–25. See generally Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative
Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (2006) (modeling lobbying as a form of legislative subsidy).
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expanding resource gap—“those who help out the most are likely to get the
greatest access. It is a natural instinct to help someone who has helped you.”413
Super PACs also enjoy a timing advantage. Their campaign finance
activities can begin cultivating influence early in campaigns; thus Super PACs
may attempt to “lock up” candidates before they are elected by forming, or
beginning to form, long-term patron–client relationships that can be exploited
later by lobbyists.414 Super PAC resources make such an objective plausible.
Such relationships make it difficult for opposing interests to persuade officials
later on to vote against early patrons’ interests. And, Super PACs and their
donors profit from the capacity to contact officials through Super PACs during
campaigns and again through lobbyists later—repeated contacts enhance
influence. Thus, Congress has recognized the increased risk of corruption
arising from campaign contributions from government contractors and
lobbyists—groups that already have frequent postelection contacts with
officials.415 Substantial early financial influence empowers Super PACs to
shape candidates’ policy agendas, which are often formed early in campaigns
and made “sticky” by the costs of breaking campaign promises.416 Agenda
change after election, when intergovernmental groups have their greatest
access, may impose costs that conflict with officials’ interest in reelection.417
This is a powerful advantage. Legislative inertia makes it difficult to force
action on issues other than those already on a legislator’s or the public’s
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Hasen, supra note 243, at 221.
See Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 127–28 (arguing that one important form of corruption is the
formation of long-term “patron–client relationship[s]” between officials and donors, the “focus of [which] is
not the enrichment of an individual politician but continued officeholding on the condition that ‘party
politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support’”). The value of durable
patron–client relationships to interest groups suggests that they will rationally seek to establish them as quickly
and for as low a price as possible.
415 See Hatch Act Amendments of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, § 5(a), 54 Stat. 767, 772 (repealed 1976)
(precluding contractor contributions); Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 138–42. FECA permits PAC contributions
but retains the rest of the Hatch Act’s prohibition. See 2 U.S.C. § 441c(b) (2012).
416 See William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The
Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislators, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 374 (1988) (noting the
importance of agenda-setting); see also Yasushi Asako, Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises visà-vis Cost of Betrayal 2 (Nov. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2226229&download=yes (“Politicians decide policy on the basis of their platforms and the
perceived cost of betrayal, and hence, platforms should be considered as partial commitment devices to restrict
a candidate’s future policy choice.”).
417 Cf. Yasushi Asako, Campaign Promises as an Imperfect Signal: How Does an Extreme Candidate Win
Against a Moderate One? 2 (June 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2227206 (modeling postelection policy choices on the assumption that breaking campaign
promises is costly).
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agenda; controlling agendas helps interest groups either overcome that inertia
or bury proposals that they oppose.418 Moreover, political advertising—a Super
PAC specialty—can raise an issue’s public salience to the point that viable
candidates must take a position on it.419 And, Super PACs may capture agenda
setters—committee chairs, the congressional leadership, legislators positioned
at key vetogates, etc.—who can control Congress’s agenda by, among other
things, sequencing proposals or otherwise leveraging vote cycles and strategic
voting to maximize their preferences.420 The intergovernmental lobby has at
times shaped the national agenda—placing UMRA on Congress’s agenda and
shaping welfare reform in 1995, for example—but agenda space is limited and
will be more difficult to secure when competing with Super PACs and their
lobbyists.421 Moreover, the intergovernmental lobby has succeeded in this
regard primarily by issuing bipartisan proposals that were already possible
under only limited circumstances.422 Super PACs’ tendency to increase
polarization may exacerbate this and other collective action problems that the
intergovernmental lobby and other public interest groups face.423
These dynamics are problematic: lobbyists rarely convince officials to
change their preexisting views but instead succeed by supporting officials’
existing positions or by persuading them on issues of low public salience about
which the officials are unlikely to have a firm position.424 Federalism is one
such issue,425 and that is doubly damaging here—it makes it easier for private
interests to shape candidates’ views and for the candidate, once elected, to
service those interests without political cost.426 Interests with early access to
418

See Riker & Weingast, supra note 416, at 389–94.
See James N. Druckman et al., Candidate Strategies to Prime Issues and Image, 66 J. POL. 1180, 1181
(2004); Walker Wilson, supra note 245, at 683–84 (discussing the use of political ads to increase issue
salience).
420 See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1183 (2001) (“[L]egislative choices . . . are driven by agenda-setters.”). See
generally Riker & Weingast, supra note 416 (analyzing agenda-setters’ power).
421 See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 143–44 (describing lobbyists’ influence on welfare reform); Garrett,
supra note 121, at 1498 (discussing UMRA).
422 See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 129–34 (arguing that success is usually bipartisan, but bipartisan
consensus is rare). See generally HAIDER, supra note 378 (discussing the intergovernmental lobby’s reliance
on “consolidation” to influence the national agenda); PAUL L. POSNER, THE POLITICS OF UNFUNDED
MANDATES: WHITHER FEDERALISM? (1998) (noting that subnational governments face collective action
problems generally).
423 See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
424 See Hasen, supra note 243, at 220 & n.172.
425 See generally Devins, supra note 95, at 131 (arguing that “the national political process does not value
structural federalism,” at least in part, because “[n]o one really cares about federalism”).
426 See sources cited supra note 291.
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the candidate and significant influence over his or her agenda, then, have the
best opportunity to shape his or her views on federalism. Accordingly, groups
with interests in centralization or deregulation may persuade a candidate to
adopt a position contrary to state autonomy on many subjects.427 That view is
what intergovernmental lobbyists must try to change—a task at which
lobbyists often fail.428 While the low public salience of federalism increases
their likelihood of success, it does not inherently favor any particular interest
group. Intergovernmental lobbyists’ resource disadvantages make these
contests uneven.
A third concern is that the increasing involvement of powerful private
interests in state elections might result in the capture of state officials that give
intergovernmental organizations their influence in Washington.429 In addition
to their incentives to seek Super PAC support for state campaigns, state
officials also may have incentives to avoid alienating potential backers for
future federal campaigns if they have federal aspirations.430 This dynamic
magnifies the growing concern that state officials increasingly prioritize
national issues over their states’ institutional interests, perhaps in part due to
the general nationalization of politics and public agendas.431 This, of course,
undermines any political safeguard that depends on state officials’ tendency to
prioritize and thus fight for state interests.
Several other problems for intergovernmental groups are created or
exacerbated by Citizens United. First, captured officials have incentives to
increase governmental complexity to camouflage their patron service. This is
problematic insofar as all political safeguards depend on a degree of
transparency in federal policymaking sufficient to alert state-interest advocates
when to act.432 It particularly complicates the intergovernmental lobby’s
already difficult and costly task of monitoring government activity for
427

See supra Part III.A.
See Hasen, supra note 243, at 227–28.
429 See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 136 (suggesting that state officials may themselves be influential
lobbyists).
430 Thus it would not be surprising to see some governors resist taking a position, through the NGA, on
proposals with serious federalism implications that also touch on controversial issues like gun control, gay
marriage, physician-assisted suicide, and others that might alienate Super PAC donors. Cf. Young, supra note
289, at 1278 (noting the federalism implications of public-policy debates in these and other controversial
areas).
431 See Young, supra note 23, at 84–85; cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on
Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001) (noting the tendency of state bureaucrats in
cooperative regimes to identify with their federal analogues more readily than state-elected counterparts).
432 See OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 139, at 70.
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incursions on state autonomy.433 Second, intergovernmental organizations “are
long-term, repeat players in the legislative process” with incentives to sustain
influence over federal offices regardless of their occupants’ party or views;434
thus, they lack outside groups’ freedom to punish federal officials who act
against their interests.435 States may threaten to withhold implementation
resources, but federal officials likely will perceive threats of shifting Super
PAC support as more immediate and consequential.436 Third, increasing
private lobbying power reinforces the status quo bias in federal policymaking:
Lobbyists fare best at resisting new legislation, which merely requires
persuading a few members controlling a vetogate and not a majority.437 This
may coincidentally favor federalism where it stalls preemptive proposals and
the like, but it will also favor wealthy interests defending a centralized or
deregulated status quo and frustrate states seeking augmented regulatory
authority through devolution or new cooperative regimes.438 Finally, the
growth of Super PACs may sharpen the self-reinforcing selection effects of
campaign-finance doctrine—Super PACs may decide which candidates to
support based on their appeal to outside groups.439 If megadonors select
candidates committed to centralization or deregulation and, thus, perhaps
hostile to continuing state regulatory power, they will further impede
intergovernmental-lobby efforts to win departures from the status quo. In the
longer run, outside groups will select candidates with narrow commitments
compatible with the groups’ objectives. Further expansion of outside-group
power, therefore, may eventually force states and their advocates to face a
generally unreceptive federal government.440
433

See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 126–31; Peabody & Nugent, supra note 70, at 54.
Peabody & Nugent, supra note 117, at 54. Some private interests and professional lobbyists are also
repeat players. Hasen, supra note 243, at 219. For this reason, bald campaign-finance threats seem more likely
to come from ideological Super PACs than established lobbying firms.
435 Corporations are similar: They gave large soft-money donations to both parties to secure access to
whoever was elected, but have avoided political spending through partisan outside groups. See McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124–25 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010);
Briffault, supra note 214, at 963; see also Imus, supra note 2 (noting that corporate spending was minor in
2012).
436 See sources cited supra notes 388–89.
437 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 270, at 70–75 (describing vetogates).
438 See Hasen, supra note 243, at 227 & n.215 (“[A] status quo bias favors wealthy interests, who have
already won in the past.”).
439 See Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REV. 953, 954–55 (2005)
(providing a theoretical overview).
440 See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny, Top Donors to Republicans Seek More Say in Senate Races, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/us/politics/top-gop-donors-seek-greater-say-in-senate-races.html
(reporting that Republican operatives created a new Super PAC to screen primary candidates).
434

PURSLEY GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

4/3/2014 2:50 PM

CAMPAIGN FINANCE SAFEGUARDS

851

These harms may be reduced if states and their lobbyists have a form of
influence over federal policy qualitatively different from that of private
interests. The states’ role in implementing federal policy—the “power of the
servant,” often crucial because of limited federal resources—may give states
exactly that.441 States frequently leverage this influence to secure concessions
from federal regulators concerning the implementation of existing programs;442
they also have used it at the legislative phase—state resistance to the federal
REAL ID Act, for example, which would require significant state
implementation, has stalled the legislation and may force changes to the basic
program.443 But this power is not limitless: States are not always free to walk
away from the bargaining table. State implementation is often a condition of
federal funding, and in some instances the money proves an irresistible
carrot.444 That states rarely decline federal funds suggests that Congress has
become skilled at making “correct estimate[s] of the nonfederal governments’
opportunity costs of providing the requested services”;445 so, too, scholars and
now the Court have recognized that spending conditions may be coercive in
view of the states’ budgetary circumstances.446 But not every state needs every
federal dollar so much that states may never credibly threaten to withhold
441 See generally Gerken, supra note 30, at 11 (arguing to reorient federalism around state and local
institutions and “develop an account of the power of the servant to compete with our existing account of the
power of the sovereign”).
442 See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 144 (detailing intergovernmental lobbyists exploiting federal
dependence on state implementation to influence the substance of the Safe Drinking Water Act).
443 See generally Mitchel N. Herian, The National Governors Association and Opposition to Homeland
Security Policy, 10 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 59 (2010) (discussing the NGA and its allies’ opposition to the
REAL ID Act).
444 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 862 (1998); see also Mitchell N.
Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1289–95 (2013) (examining the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
clarify the distinction between coercion- and compulsion-based rationales for invalidating spending
conditions).
445 Hills, supra note 444, at 862; cf. Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 100–01 (showing that conditional grants are not inevitably
coercive).
446 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605, 2633 (2012) (holding that the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provisions, which threatened states with an
aggregate loss of $233 billion in federal funding, or over ten percent of state budgets, was unconstitutionally
coercive because states had no reasonable choice to refuse to adopt the expanded Medicaid coverage
conditions in the face of such a large financial penalty for refusing to do so); see also id. at 2644; South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (announcing the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine). See generally
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO.
L.J. 1 (2001) (canvassing academic views); Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875
(2008) (analyzing state decisions to accept federal funds).
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implementation resources.447 Intergovernmental lobby groups are often
vehicles for this form of state influence; thus, to the extent that the post–
Citizens United landscape diminishes the power of groups like the NGA,
states’ “power of the servant” may correspondingly decline.448
CONCLUSION
The states have adapted to changing political environments by developing
various channels of influence in Congress, federal agencies, political parties,
and ad hoc negotiations.449 The sophistication of state governments as political
operators seems a crucial feature of the system of nonjudicial federalism
safeguards. However, states’ influence is threatened by the rise of equally
sophisticated, better funded, and—because of their capacity for unlimited
spending—more powerful political vehicles for private interest-group
influence. These interests will have most of the political power but will hardly
ever advocate federalism for its own sake. When they do fight for state
autonomy they will most likely do so to advance their own substantive policy
goals—goals which, if suddenly better served by nationalization or
deregulation, will dictate abandoning federalism. And often they will have
strong incentives to straightforwardly oppose state governments’ attempts to
maintain or increase their regulatory autonomy. Because they are
interconnected and all depend to some degree on state influence, this affects
every form of nonjudicial safeguard.450 For example, weakening the parties
enables easier private-interest capture of officials which, in turn, pushes states’
interests down the list of priorities, hamstringing intergovernmental lobbying
efforts and other forms of state bargaining.
Super PACs do not directly undermine all federalism safeguards—Clark’s
inertia and Gerken’s “power of the servant” may survive relatively intact.451
But there are reasons to worry: Ideological interest groups that command large
slates of officials—including, perhaps, important vetogate-holders—may
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See Hills, supra note 445, at 861–63.
See NUGENT, supra note 29, at 134; Hills, supra note 445, at 866.
449 See Robert A. Schapiro, Book Review, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 968, 969 (2009) (reviewing NUGENT, supra
note 29) (noting adaptations, including lobbying); see also Bednar, supra note 36, at 270 (describing
federalism as a complex adaptive system); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 1705 (emphasizing political
actors’ adaptability); Ryan, supra note 35, at 7, 8–9 (noting that across contexts, “public actors work
bilaterally across state-federal lines to safeguard federalism by negotiating the terms of governance”).
450 See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text (discussing interconnections).
451 See generally Clark, supra note 31; Gerken, supra note 30.
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successfully press measures that could not pass under normal circumstances.452
A narrow ideological agenda makes it easier to discipline officials; and
discipline is one solution to congressional inertia. As for the power of the
servant, states’ leverage as federal policy implementers may not be directly
diminished by Super PAC politics. But the system’s safeguards are
interconnected—if states rely on intergovernmental lobbying groups to assert
their implementation leverage, then the practical value of that leverage will
diminish with the influence of those groups. And the power’s value for state
autonomy necessarily shrinks when decoupled from mechanisms through
which states shape, ex ante, the federal programs that they will implement.
Both inertia and the power of the servant are ex post safeguards—if the ex ante
mechanisms stop working, states will meet federal intrusion primarily from a
reactive posture—running interference in Congress or negotiating with federal
agencies over implementation of a regime they had little hand in shaping—that
seems on balance less promising for protecting state prerogatives. Moreover,
as outside groups increasingly turn their attention to state elections, there is
also increasing risk that state governments themselves may be captured and
turned against their own institutional interests. The post–Citizens United
system, then, seems on balance less protective of state autonomy.
The loss of state influence across political contexts will affect constitutional
construction. Excluding states from the process of constitutional development
runs counter to the idea of federalism—which suggests continuing state
government influence on at least nonmandatory structural developments—by
diminishing the extent to which the negotiated set of constructive federalism
norms is a product of state, as well as federal, inputs. Constitutional
construction also has instrumental significance insofar as it creates guidelines
for future government interactions that increase the stability and predictability
of the structure by precluding large deviations from established practice.
Excluding the states from parts of this constructive process diminishes their
capacity for self-defense in a broad sense.
We need new federalism theory and doctrine that accounts for these new
political realities to recalibrate federalism theory’s normative programs. More
judicial intervention on behalf of states may be necessary, but other remedies
are worth considering. We might, for example, fold federalism considerations
into campaign finance jurisprudence—not necessarily as decisive, all-trumping
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See supra notes 341–74 and accompanying text.

PURSLEY GALLEYSPROOFS

854

4/3/2014 2:50 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:781

constitutional requirements, but perhaps as defeasible reasons for decision.453
Conventional justifications for campaign finance restrictions were increasingly
criticized even before the Supreme Court rejected most of them in Citizens
United.454 Alternative justifications—such as preventing long-term incumbent
clientelism, increasing voter and small-donor participation, and increasing the
strength of political parties—have been floated.455 Highlighting the extent to
which doctrinal devices like the contribution/expenditure distinction work to
undermine federalism, perhaps alone or coupled with standard anticorruption
interests, should justify a more balanced constitutional standard—one that,
perhaps, would reinforce federalism’s political safeguards by permitting some
new limitations on outside spending, greater latitude for candidates and parties
on small-donor development, a more exacting test for candidate coordination
with outside groups, new limits on competition with political parties, or
something else. Such doctrinal change would not be incoherent—reinforcing
federalism advances many of the same basic democratic values that undergird
campaign finance doctrine. Legislative initiatives that strengthen parties—
particularly state parties—or that level the playing field for intergovernmental
lobby groups all would help to offset the power of unregulated outside
spending.456
Understanding the shape of the problem is crucial to formulating workable
solutions. Campaign finance scholarship has long focused on a narrow set of
values to the exclusion of other considerations that could broaden its normative
scope. And federalism theory has for too long relied upon an idealized model
of the political process that bears little resemblance to reality. It is obvious
already that Citizens United and its progeny have caused a tectonic shift in our
political system. The full consequences remain to be seen, but they are
materializing with surprising speed. Super PACs collected and spent nearly
$2 billion within the first two election cycles after their legalization. But the
dramatic rate of change must not distract us from the longer view—and the
long-term consequences of unregulated outside electoral spending for the
453 See Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 ALA. L. REV. 801, 817–22 (2012); see also Mitchell
N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 92–95 (2004) (arguing that the formulation of
constitutional doctrine may be legitimately influenced by pragmatic considerations, such as institutional
capacity, interbranch friction, adjudicatory manageability, and others).
454 See generally, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10 (arguing that political money is a hydraulic
force such that reforms are unlikely to eliminate the risk of corruption); Krasno & Sorauf, supra note 291, at
130–39 (arguing that “corruption” is too malleable to support regulation).
455 See generally, e.g., Overton, supra note 23 (arguing for states’ interest in participation).
456 See generally, e.g., Gerken, supra note 43 (proposing various leveling-up and leveling-down strategies
to even the lobbyist/non-lobbyist playing field); Hasen, supra note 243 (discussing lobbying).
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fundamental constitutional structure have not, so far, been the focus. I draw
attention to them here not only to ensure that they are not missed in the frenzy
to emphasize the straightforward money-in-politics effects on democratic
values, but also to emphasize the significance of these subtler but potentially
more significant dynamics. To more fully address persistent normative
puzzles—why states persist despite weak judicial protection, how courts can
improve federalism doctrine, how federalism benefits society, how the
Constitution entrenches the structure of government, and so forth—we must
incorporate complex and often messy truths about states’ political
circumstances into our theories.

